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tures on the certificates. I cannot see any distinction between forgery and other fraud, which, it has been contended exists.
Judgment for plaintiff.
Ever since the celebrated " Schuyler
Fraud cases" the law of America has been
considered settled on the point involved

to the owner of stock whose name has

in our principal case. There, as is well
known, Robert Schuyler, an officer of
the Ncw York and NTw Haven Railroad
Co., fraudulently issued stock, overissued beyond the amount of the capital
stock, which various parties received in
good faith, and the company were held
responsible to the holders for damages
thereby sustained, the certificates themselves being held void and of no value,
as, in fact, they represented nothing:
N. Y. J N. 1. Railroad Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30 and 80. And this just
rule has been repeatedly followed in other
states: Bank of Kentuckl v. The Schuylkill Bank, I Pars. Eq. .R. 180 ; Willis
v. Fry, 13 1'hila. R. 33 ; 36 Leg. Int.
47.
In such cases the act of the officer,
though fraudulent, is the act of the corporation.
In like manner a corporation is liable

ing thereon in good faith, have cancelled the old certificate and issued a
new certificate to the supposed lawful
holder by such forged transfer : Pratt v.
Afachinists' .Nat. Bank, 123 Mass. 110 ;
Pratt v. Boston - Albany Railroad Co.,
126 Iass. 443; Blaisdell v. Bohr, 68
Gao. 56 ; Pollock v. National Bank, 3
Selden 274; S1oman v. Bank of .England, 14 Sir. 475 ; Milidland Railway v.
Taylor, 8 H. L. Cas. 751.
In such case, however, the corporation
is not without remedy, since it has an
action over against the party presenting
the forged transfer, on the ground of
an implied warranty that such transfer
is genuine and valid, even if such party
be not the forger, but acted in good
faith : Boston 4- Albany Railroad Co. v.
Richardson, 135 Mass. 473.
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The conductor of a railway train who commands its movements, directs when it
shall start, at what stations it shall stop, and at what speed it shall run, and has the
general management of it and control over the persons employed upon it, represents
the company, and for injuries resulting from his negligent acts the company is
responsible.
The conductdr of a railway train is the representative of the company, standing
in its place and stead in the running of the train. The engineer is in that particular the conductor's subordinate, and for the former's negligence, by which the latter
is injured, the company is responsible.
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J. W. Oary, for plaintiff in error.
. K.-Davis and Enoch Totten, for defendant in error.
The fadts are fully stated in the opinion, which was delivered by
FIELD, J.-The plaintiff in the court below is a citizen of Min-

nesota, and by occupation an engineer on a railway train. The
defendant in the court below, the plaintiff in error here, is a railway corporation created under the laws of Wisconsin. This action
is brought to recover damages for injuries which the plaintiff sustained while engineer of a freight train, by a collisiop with a gravel
train on the 6th of November 1880. Both trains belonged to the
company, and for some years he had been employed as such engineer on its roads. On that day he was in charge of the engine of
a regular freight train which left Minneapolis'at a quarter past one
in the morning, its regular schedule time, and had the right of the
road over gravel trains, except when otherwise ordered. At the time
of the collision one McOlintock was the conductor of the train, and
had the entire charge of running it. It was his duty, under the
regulations of the company, to show to the engineer all orders
which he received with respect to the movements of the train.
The regulations in this respect were as follows: "Conductors must,
in all cases, when running by telegraph and special orders, show
the same to the engineer of their train before leaving stations where
the orders are received. The engineer must read and understand the order before leaving the station. The conductor will have
charge and control of the train, and of all persons employed on it,
and is responsible for its movements while on the road, except
when his directions conflict with these regulations, or involve any
risk or hazard, in which case the engineer will also be held responsible."
When the freight train left Minneapolis on the morning of November 6th 1880, there was coming towards that city from Fort
Snelling, by order of the company, over the same road, a gravel
train, termed in the complaint a "wild train ;" that is, a train
not running on schedule time any regular trips. The conductor,
McOlintock, was informed by telegram from the train dispatcher
of the coming of this gravel train, and ordered to hold the freight
train at South Minneapolis until the gravel train arrived. South
Minneapolis is between Minneapolis and the place where the collision occurred. The gravel train had been engaged for a week
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before in hauling in the night gravel to Minneapolis from a pit
near Mendota, for the construction by the company of a new and
separate line of railroad between St. Paul and Minneapolis, and the
freight train had, during this time, been stopped by the conductor,
on orders of the train dispatcher, upon side tracks between Minneapolis and St. Paul Junction for the passage of the gravel traim
But on the night of November 6th 1880, he neglected to deliver to
the plaintiff the order he had received, and after the train started
he went into the caboose and there fell asleep. The freight train,
of course did not stop at the station designated, but, continuing at
a speed of fifteen miles an hour, entered a deep and narrow cut
three hundred feet in length, through which the road passed at a
considerable curve, and on a down grade, when the plaintiff saw
on the bank a reflection of the light from the engine of the gravel
train, which was approaching from the opposite. direction at a speed
of five or six miles an hour, and was then within about one hundred
feet. He at once whistled for brakes and reversed his engine, but
a collision almost immediately followed, destroying the engines,
damaging the cars of the two trains, causing the death of one person, and inflicting upon the plaintiff severe and permanent injuries,
for which he brings this action.
On the trial the conductor of the gravel train testified that at the
time of the collision he was under orders to run to South Minneapolis regardless of the plaintiff's train; that having twelve cars
loaded with gravel his train stalled before reaching the cut where
the collision happened; that he then separated his train in the
middle, took six cars to Minnehaha station, went back with the
engine for the other six cars, and was coming with them through
the cut when the collision occurred; that the gravel train had run
in the night about a week, and that when he could reach Minneapolis before the starting time of plaintiff's train he ran without
orders, otherwise upon orders, and had met or passed plaintiff's
train at the same place about every night during the week.
It is evident from this brief statement that the conductor on each
train was guilty of gross negligence. The conductor of the freight
train was nbt only required by the general duty devolving on him
as one controlling its movements to give to its engineer such orders
as would enable him to avoid collision with other cars, but, as we
have seen, he was expressly directed by the regulations of the company, when running by telegraph or special orders, to communicate
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them to him. Had these regulations been complied with the collision would have been avoided. The conductor of the gravel train
allowed it to be so overloaded that its engine was incapable of
moving it at one portion of the road before reaching the cut; and
when, in consequence, he was obliged to leave half of his cars on
the track while he took the others to Minnehaha, he omitted to send
fbrward information of the delay or to put out signals of danger.
Having for the week previous passed the freight train at nearly the.
same place on the road, he must have known that by the delay there
was danger of collision. Ordinary prudence, therefore, would have
dictated the sending forward of information of his'position, or the
putting out of danger signals. Had he done either of these things
the collision would not have occurred.
The collision having been caused by the gross negligence of the
conductors, the question arises whether the company is responsible
to the plaintiff for the injuries which that collision inflicted upon
him. The general liability of a railroad company for injuries caused
by the negligence of its servants to passengers and others not in its
service is conceded. It covers all injuries to which they do not
contribute. But where injuries befall a servant in its employ, a
different principle applies. Having been engaged for the performance of specified services, he takes upon himself the ordinary risks
incident thereto. As a consequence, if he suffers by exposure to
them, he cannot recover compensation from his employer. The
obvious reason for this exemption is that he has, or in law is supposed to have, them in contemplation when he engaged in the
service, and that his compensation is arranged accordingly. He
cannot, in reason, complain if he suffers from a risk which he has
voluntarily assumed, and for the assumption of which lie is paid.
There is also another reason often assigned for this exemptionthat of a supposed public policy. It is assumed that the exemption
operates as a stimulant to diligence and caution on the part of the
servant for his own safety as well as that of his master. Much
potency is ascribed to this assumed fact by reference to those cases
where diligence and caution on the part of servants constitute the
chief protection against accidents. But it may be doubted whether
the exemption has the effect thus claimed for it. We have never
known parties more willing to subject themselves to dangers of life
or limb because, if losing the one, or suffering in the other, damages could be recovered by their representatives or themselves for
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the loss or injury. The dread of personal injury has always
proved sufficient to bring into exercise the vigilance and activity of
the servant. But, however this may be, it is indispensable to the
employer's exemption from liability to his servant for the consequences of risks thus incurred that he should himself be free from
negligence. He must furnish the servant the means and appliances
which the service requires for its efficient and safe performance,
unless otherwise stipulated; and if he fail in that respect, and an
injury result, he is as liable to the servant as he would be to a
stranger. In other words, while claiming such exemption he must
not himself be guilty of contributory negligence.
When the service to be rendered requires for its performance the
employment of several persons, as in the movement of railway
trains, there is necessarily incident to the service of each the risk
that the others may fail in the vigilance and caution essential to
his safety. And it has been held in numerous cases, both in this
country and in England, that there is implied in his contract of
service in such cases that he takes upon himself the risks arising
from the negligence of his fellow-servants while in the same employment, provided always the master is not negligent in their selection
or retention, or in furnishing adequate materials and means for the
work; and that if injuries then befall him from such negligence,
the master is not liable. The doctrine was first announced in this
country by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in 1841, in Xfurray v. Railroad (o., 1 McMull. 885, and was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts the following year in Farwell v.
Boston 4 Worcester 1. Co., 4 Mete. 49. In the South Carolina case,
a fireman, while in the employ of the company, was injured by the
negligence of an engineer also in its employ, and it was held that
the company was not liable, the court observing that the engineer
no more represented the company than the fireman; that each in
his separate department represented his principal; that the regular
movement of the train of cars to its destination was the result of the
ordinary performance by each of his several duties; and that it
seemed to be on the part of the several agents a joint undertaking
where each one stipulated for the performance of his several part;
that they were not liable to the company for the conduct of each
other, nor was the company liable to one for the conduct of another,
and that, as a general rule, when there was no fault in the owner,
he was only liable to his servants for wages.
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In the Massachusetts case, an engineer employed by a railroad
company to run a train on its road was injured by the negligence
of a switch-tender also in its employ, and it was held that the company was- not liable, The court placed the exemption of the company, not on the ground of the South Carolina decision, that there
was a joint undertaking by the fellow-servants, but on the ground
that the contract of the engineer implied that he would take upon
himself the risks attending its performance; that those included
the injaries which might befall him from the negligence of fellowservants in the same employment; and that the switch-tender stood
in that relation to him. And the court added that the exemption
of the master was supported by considerations of policy. "When
several persons," it said, "are employed in the conduct of one
common enterprise or undertaking, and the safety of each depends
on the care and skill with which each other shall perform his appropriate duty, each is an observer of the conduct of the others, can
give notice of any misconduct, incapacity, or neglect of duty, and
leave the service, if the common employer will not take such precautions and employ such agents as the safety of the whole party
may require. By these means the safety of each will be much
more effectually secured than could be done by a resort to the common employer for indemnity in the case of loss by the negligence
of each other." And to the argument, which was strongly pressed,
that though the rule might apply where two or more servants are
employed in the same department of duty, where each one can
exert some influence over the conduct of the other, and thus, to
some extent, provide for his own security, yet that it could not
apply where two or more are employed in different departments of
duty, at a distance from each other, and where one can in no degree
control or influence the conduct of another, it answered that the
objection was founded upon a supposed distinction, on which it
would be extremely difficult to establish a practical rule. "When
the object to be accomplished," it said, "is one and the same, ,when
the employers are the same, and the several persons employed
derive their authority and their compensation from the same source,
it would be extremely difficult to distinguish what constitutes one
department and what a distinct department of duty. It would
vary with the circumstances of every case." And it added, "that
the argument rests upon an assumed principle of responsibility
which does not exist. The master, in the case supposed, is not
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exempt from liability because the servant has better means of providing for his safety, when he is employed in immediate connection
with those from whose negligence he might suffer, but because the
implied contract of the master does not extend to indemnify the
servant against the negligence of any one but himself; and he is
not li.ble in tort, as for the negligence of his servant, because the
person suffering does not stand towards him in the relation of a
stranger, but is one whose rights are regulated by contract, express
or implied." 4 Mete. 49, 60. The opinion in this case, which
was delivered by Chief Justice Siuiw, has exerted great influence
in controlling the course of decisions in this country. In several
states it has been followed, and the English courts have cited it with
marked commendation.
The doctrine of the master's exemption from liability was first
distinctly announced in England in 1850 by the Court of Exchequer
in Hutchinson v. York, N. . d"B. By. Co., 5 Exch. 343. Priestly
v. Bowler, 3 Mees. & W. 1, which was decided in 1837, and is
often cited as the first case declaring the doctrine, did not directly
involve the question as to the liability of a master to a servant for
the negligence of a fellow-servant. In that case a van of the
defendant in which the plaintiff was carried was out of repair, and
overloaded, and consequently broke down, and caused the injury
complained of; but it did not appear what produced the defect in
the van, or by whom it was overloaded. The court, in giving its
decision against the plaintiff, observed that if the master was liable,
the principle of that liability would "carry us to an alarming
extent;" and in illustration of this statement said that if the owner
of a carriage was responsible for its sufficiency to his servant, he
was, under the principle, responsible for the negligence of his
coach-maker, or harness-maker, or coachman, and mentioned other
instances of such possible responsibility to a servant for the negligence of his fellows, concluding that the inconvenience of such consequences afforddd a sufficient argument against the application of
the principle to that case. The case, therefore, can only be considered as indirectly asserting the doctrine. At any rate, the
IHtutchinson case is the first one where the doctrine was applied to
railway service. There it appeared that a servant of the company
who, in the discharge of his duty, was riding on one of its trains,
was injured by a collison with another train of the same company,
from which his death ensued; and it was held that his representa-
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tives could not recover, as he was a fellow-servant with those who
caused the injury; and the court -aid that whether the death
resulted from the mismanagement of the one train or the other, or
of both, did not affect the principle. The rule was applied at the
same time by that court to exempt a master-builder from liability
for the death of a bricklayer in his employ, caused by the defective
construction of a scaffolding by his brother workmen, by reason of
which it broke, and the bricklayer at work upon it was thrown to
the ground and killed. Wigmore v. Jay, 5 Exch. 354. The doctrine assumes that the servant causing the injury is in the same
employment with the servant injured; that is that both are engaged
in a common employment. The question in all cases therefore is,
what is essential to render the service in which different persbns
are engaged a common employment? And this question has caused
much conflict of opinion between different courts, and often much
vacillation of opinion in the same court.
In Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Beid, and the Same Co. v. .ifcGuire,
reported in 3 Macq. H. L. Cas. 266, 300, decided in 1858, the parties injured were miners employed to work in a coal-pit; and the
party whose negligence caused the injury was employed to attend
to the engine by which they were let down into the mine and
brought out, and the coal was raised which they had dug; and it
was held that they were engaged in a common work, that of getting
coal from the pit. "The miners," said the court in the latter case,
could not perform their part unless they were lowered to their work;
nor could the end of their common labor be attained unless the coal
which they got was raised to the pit's mouth; and, of course, at
the close of their day's labor the workman must be lifted out of
the mine. Every person who engaged in such an employment
must have been perfectly aware that all this was incident to it, and
that the service was necessarily accompanied with the danger that
the person intrusted with the machinery might be occasionally negligent, and fail in his duty." Lord Chancellor CHELMSFORD, who
gave the principal opinion in the latter case, referred to previous
cases in which the master's exemption from liability had been sustained, and said: "In the consideration of these cases it did not
become necessary to define with any great precision what was meant
by the words 'common service' or Icommon employment,' and
perhaps it might be difficult beforehand to suggest any exact definition of them. It is necessary, however, in each particular case to

102

CHICAGO, Al. & ST. P. RY. CO. v. ROSS.

ascertain whether servants are fellow-laborers in the same work,
because, although a servant may be taken to have engaged to
encounter all risks which are incident to the service which he undertakes, yet he cannot be expected to anticipate those which may
happen to him on occasions foreign to his employment. Where
servants, therefore are engaged in different departments of duty,
an injury committed by one servant upon another, by carelessness
or negligence in the course of his peculiar work, is not within the
exemption, and the master's liability attaches in that case in the
same manner as if the injured servants stood in no such relation to
him." The Lord Chancellor also commented upon some decisions
of the Scotch courts, and among others that of MelVaughton v.
Caledonian By. Co., 19 Ct. Sess. Cas. 271, and said that it might
be "sustained- without conflicting with the English authorities, on
the ground that the workmen in that case were engaged in totally
different departments of work, the deceased being a joiner or carpenter who, at the time of the accident, was engaged in repairing
a railway carriage; and the persons by whose negligence his death
was occasioned, were the engine-driver and the persons who arranged
the switches." And in the same case Lord BROUGHAM, after mentioning the observations of a judge of the Scottish courts that an
absolute and inflexible rule, releasing the master from responsibility
in every case where one servant is injured by the fault of another,
was utterly unknown to the law of Scotland, said that it was also
utterly unknown to the law of England, and added: "To bring the
case within the exemption there must be this most material qualification: that the two servants must be men in the same common
employment, and engaged in the same common work under that
common employment."
Later decisions in the English courts extend the master's exemption from liability to cases where the servant injured is working
under the direction of a foreman or superintendent, the grade of
service of the latter not being deemed to change the relation of the
two as fellow-servants. Thus, in Wilson v. Mferry, decided by the
House of L'ords in 1868, on appeal from the Court of Session of Scotland, the sub-manager of a coal-pit, whose negligence in erecting a
scaffold which obstructed the circulation of air underneath, led
to an accumulation of fire-damp that exploded and injured a workman in the mine, was held to be a fellow-servant with the injured
party. And the court laid down the rule that the master was not

CHICAGO, M1.& ST. P. RY. CO. v. ROSS.

103

liable to his servant unless there was negligence on the master's
part in that which he had contracted with the servant to do, and
that the master, if not personally superintending the work, was
only bound to select proper and competent persons to do so, and
furnish them with adequate materials and resources for the work;
that when he had done this he had done all that he was required
to do, 'and if the persons thus selected were guilty of'negligence, it was not his negligence, and he was not responsible for the
consequences. L. R., 1 H. L. Scotch App. 326. In this case, as
in many others in the English courts, the forenjan, manager, or
superintendent of the work, by whose negligence the injury was
committed, was himself also a workman with the other laborers,
although exercising a direction over the work. The reasoning of
that case has been applied so as to include, as contended here,
employees of a corporation in a department separated from each
other, and it must be admitted that the terms "common employment," under late decisions in England, and the decisions in this
country following the Massachusetts case, are of very comprehensive import. It is difficult to limit them so as to say that any persons
employed by a railway company, whose labors may facilitate the
running of its trains, are not fellow-servants, however widely separated may be their labors. See Holden v. Fitc burg B. Co., 129
Mfass. 268. But,.notwithstanding the number and weight of such
decisions, there are, in this country, many adjudications of courts
of great learning restricting the exemption to cases where the fellow-servants are engaged in the same department, and act under
the same immediate direction ; and holding that, within the reason
and principle of the doctrine, only such servants can be considered
as engaged in the same common employment. It is not, however,
essential to the decision of the present controversy to lay down a
rule which will determine, in all cases, what is to be deemed such
an employment, even if it were possible to do so.
There is, in our judgment, a clear distinction to be made in their
relation to their common principal between servants of a corporation exercising no supervision over others engaged with them in the
same employment and agents of the corporation, clothed with the
control and management of a distinct department, in which their
duty is entirely that of direction and superintendence. A conductor having the entire control and management of a railway train
occupies a very different position from the brakeman, the porters,
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and other subordinates employed. He is in fact, and should be
treated as, the personal representative of the corporation, for whose
negligence-it is responsible to subordinate servants. This view of
his relation to the corporation seems to us a reasonable and just
one, and it will insure more care in the selection of such agents,
and thus give greater security to the servants engaged under him
in an employment requiring the utmost vigilance on their part, and
prompt and unhesitating obedience to his orders. The rule which
applies to such agents of one railway corporation must apply to all,
and many corporations operate every day several trains over hundreds of miles at great distances apart, each being under the control
and direction of a conductor specially appointed for its management.
We know from the manner in which railways are operated that,
subject to the general rules and orders of the directors of the companies, the conductor has entire control and management of the
train to which lie is assigned. le directs when i't shall start, at
what speed it shall run, at what stations it shall stop and for what
length of time, and everything essential to its successful movements,
and all persons employed on it are subject to his orders. In no
proper sense of the term is lie a fellow-servant with the fireman,
the brakeman, the porters, and the engineer. The latter are
fellow-sc'vants in the running of the train under his direction, who
as to them and the train, stands in the place of and represents the
corporation.
As observed by Mr. Wharton in his valuable Treatise on the
Law of Negligence: "It has sometimes been said that a corporation
is obliged to act always by servants, and that it is unjust to impute
to it personal negligence in cases where it is impossible for it to be
negligent personally. But if this be true it would relieve corporations from all liability to servants. The true view is that, as corporations can act only through superintending officers, the negligences of those officers, with respect to other servants, are the
negligences of the corporation." Section 232 a. The author, in
a note, refers to Brickner v. New York Cent. B. Co., decided in
the Supreme Court of New York, and afterwards affirmed in the
Court of Appeals; and to Malone v. Hathaway, decided in the
latter court, in which opinions are expressed in conformity with his
views. These opinions are not, it is true, auth oritative, for they do
not cover the precise points in judgment; but were rather expressed
to distinguish the questions thus arising from those then before the
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court. They indicate, however a disposition to ingraft a limitation
upon the doctrine as to the master's exemption from liability to his
servants for the negligence of their fellows, when a corporation is
the principal, and acts through superintending agents. Thus, in
the first case, the court said : "A corporation cannot act personally.
It requires some person to superintend structures, to purchase and
control the running of cars, to employ and discharge men, and
provide all needful appliances. This can only be done by agents.
When the directors themselves personally act as such agents, they
are the representatives of the corporation. They are then the
executive head or master. Their acts are the acts of the corporation. The duties above described are the duties of the corporation.
When the directors appoint some person other than themselves to
superintend and perform all these executive duties for them, then
such appointee, equally with themselves, represents the corporation
as master in all those respects. And though, in the performance
of these executive duties, he may be, and is, a servant of the corporation, he is not in those respects a co-servant, a co-laborer, a
co-employee, in the common acceptation of those terms, any more
than is a director who exercises the same authority." 2 Lans. 516.
Affirmed in 49 N. Y. 672. And in Malone v. Hathaway, in the
Court of Appeals, Judge ALLEN says: "Corporations necessarily
acting by and through agents, those having the superintendence
of various departments, with delegated authority to employ and
discharge laborers and employees, provide materials and machinery
for the service of the corporation, and generally direct and control
under general powers and instructions from the directors, may well
be regarded as the representatives of the corporation, charged with
the performance of its duties, exercising the discretion ordinarily
exercised by principals, and, within the limits of the delegated
authority, the acting principal. These acts are in such case the
acts of the corporation, for which and for whose neglect, the cotporation, within adjudged cases, must respond, as well to the other
servants of the company as to strangers. They are treated as the
general agents of the corporation in the several departments committed to their care." 64 N. Y. 12. See, also, Corcoran v. Hfolbrook, 59 N. Y. 517.
In Little Miami B. Co. v. Stevens, the Supreme Court of Ohio
held that where a railroad company placed the engineer in its employ
under the control of a conductor of its train, who directed when the
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cars were to start and when to stop, it was liable for an injury
received by him caused by the negligence of the conductor: 20
Ohio 415. There a collision between two trains occurred in consequence of the omission of the conductor to inform the engineer
of a change of places in the passing of trains ordered by the company. Exemption from liability was claimed on the ground that
Lne engineer and conductor were fellow-servants, and that the engineer had, in consequence, taken, by his contract of service, the risk
of the negligence of the conductor; and also that public policy
forbade a recovery in such cases. But the court rejected both positions. To the latter it very pertinently observed that it was only
when the servant had himself been careful that any right of action
could accrue to him, and that it was not likely that any would be
careless of their lives and persons or property merely because they
might have a right of action to recover for injuries received. "If
men are influenced," said the court, " by such remote considerations to be careless of what they are likely to be most careful about,
it has never come under our observation. We think the policy is
clearly on the other side. It is a matter of universal observation
that, in any extensive business where many persons are employed,
the care and prudence of the employer is the surest guaranty against
mismanagement of any kind." In Railway Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio
St. 201, the same court affirmed the doctrine thus announced, and
decided that when a brakeman in the employ of a railroad company,
on a train under the control of a conductor having exclusive command, was injured by the carelessness of the conductor, the company
was responsible; holding that the conductor in such case was the
sole and immediate representative of the company, upon which
rested the obligation to manage the train with skill and care. In
the course of an elaborate opinion the court said that, from the very
nature of 'the contract of service between the company and employees, the company was under obligation to them to superintend
and control with skill and care the dangerous force employed, upon
which their safety so essentially depended. "For this purpose,"
said the court, "the conductor is employed, and in this he directly
represents the company. They contract for and engage his care
and skill. They commission him to exercise that dominion over
the operations of the train which essentially pertains to the prerogatives of the owner, and in its exercise he stands in the place
of the owner, and is in the discharge of a duty which the owner, as
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a man, and a party to the contract of service, owes to those placed
under him, and whose lives may depend on his fidelity. His will
alone controls everything, and it is the will of the owner that his

intelligence alone should be trusted for this purpose. This service
is- not common to him and the hands placed under him. They
have nothing to do with it. His duties and their duties are entirely
separate and distinct, although both necessary to produce the result.
It is his to command and theirs to obey and execute. No service
is common that does not admit a common participation, and no
servants are fellow-servants when one is placed in control over the
other."
In Louisville ..
N. B. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duv. 114, the subject
was elaborately considered by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky;
and it held that, in all those operations which require care, vigilance
and skill, and which are performed through the instrumentality of
superintending agents, the invisible corporation, though never actually, is yet always constructively, present through its agents who
represent it, and whose acts, within their respective spheres, are
its acts; that the rule of the English courts, that the company is
not responsible to one of its -servants for an injury inflicted from
-the neglect of a fellow-servant, was not adopted to its full extent in
that state, and was regarded there as anomalous, inconsistent with
principle and public policy, and unsupported by any good and consistent reason. In commenting upon this decision in his Treatise
on the Law of Railways, Redfield speaks with emphatic approval
of the declaration that the corporation is to be regarded as constructively present in all acts performed by its general agents within
the scope of their authority. "The consequences of mistake or
misapprehension upon this point," says the author, "have led many
courts into conclusions greatly at variance with the common instincts
of reason and humanity, and have tended to interpose an unwarrantable shield between the conduct of railway employees and the
just responsibility of the company. We trust that the reasonableness and justice of this construction will, at no distant day, induce
its universal adoption."
There are decisions in the courts of other states, more or less in
conformity with those cited from Ohio and Kentucky, rejecting
or limiting, to a greater or less extent, the master's exemption from
liability to a servant for the negligent conduct of his fellows. We
agree with them in holding-and the present case requires no
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further decision-that the conductor of a railway train, who commands its movements, directs when it shall start, at what stations it
shall stop, at what speed it shall run, and has the general management of it, and control over the persons employed upon it, represents
the company, and therefore that, for injuries resulting from his negligent acts, the company is responsible. If such a conductor does
not represent the company, then the train is operated without any
representative of its owner. If, now, we apply these views of the
relation of the conductor of a railway train to the company, and to
the subordinates under him on the train, the objections urged to the
charge of the court will be readily disposed of. Its language, in
some sentences, may be open to verbal criticism, but its purport
touching the liability of the company is that the conductor and
engineer, though both employees, were not fellow-servants in the
sense in which that term is used in the decisions; that the former
was the representative of the company, standing in its place and
stead in the riunning of the train, and that the latter was, in that
particular, his subordinate, and that for the former's negligence,
by which the latter was injured, the company was responsible.
It was not disputed on the trial that the collision which caused
the injury complained of was the result of the negligence of the
conductor of the freight train, in failing to show to the engineer
the order which he had received, to stop the train at South Minneapolis until the gravel train, coming on the same road from an
opposite direction, had passed; and the court charged the jury that
if they so found, and if the plaintiff did not contribute to his injury
by his own negligence, the company was liable; holding that the
relation of superior and inferior was created by the company, as
between the two, in the operation of its train, and that they were
not, within the reason of the law, fellow-servants engaged in the
same common employment. As this charge was, in our judgment, correct, the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the conceded
negligence of the conductor. The charge on other points is immaterial; whether correct or erroneous, it could not have changed the
result; the verdict of the jury could not have been otherwise than
for the plaintiff. Without declaring, therefore, whether any error
was committed in the charge on other points, it is sufficient to say
that we will not reverse the judgment below if an error was committed on the trial which could not have affected the verdict.
.Brobst v. Brock, 10 Wall. 519. And, with respect to the negli-
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gence of the conductor of the gravel train, no instruction was given
or requested.
Judgment affirmed.
BRADILEY,

J.-Justices

MATTHEWS,

GRAY,

BLATCHFORD

and

myself dissent from the judgment of the court. We think that the
conductor of the railroad train in this case was a fellow-servant of
the railroad company with the other employees on the train. We
think that to hold otherwise would be to break down the long-established rule with regard to the exemption from responsibility of
employers for injuries to their servants by the negligence of their
fellow-servants.
ray v. Currie, L. R., 6 C. P. 24 ; Price
v. H. D. N. Co., 46 Tex. 535.
This principle applies to a minor 19
general principle which prevails in England and the United States is, that one years of age. But in Siegel v. Schuntz,
who enters the service of another takes 2 N. Y. (S. C.) 353, the master was held
upon himself the ordinary risks of the liable for the negligence of a foreman in
employment in which he engages, includ- placing a boy of 12 years in a daning the negligent acts of his fellow-ser- gerous position. See also Coombs v.
vants in the course of the common N c-t Bedford C. Co., 102 Mass. 573.
employment. The first English authority And a railway company is liable where
upon the subject is the case of Priestly v. a minor is set to do perilous work for
Folder, 3 Mees. & Wes. 1, decided in which he was not employed. By. Co. v.
1837. In the United States the question Fort, 17 Wall. 553. But see Anderson
does not seem to have been passed upon v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 274; Curran v.
until 1841, in Murray v. Railway Co., 1 Merchants' Afanuf. Co., 130 Mass. 374.
As to what negligence is deemed that
McMullan 385. The next case was Farwell v. Boston, 4-c., Ry., 4 Met. 49. In of a fellow-servant, see Smith v. Lowell
this case Air. Chief Justice SnAW, in an 3fanuf. Co., 124 Mass. 114; Killea v.
exhaustive opinion, approved the former Faxon, 125 Mass. 485. A railway coincases. The general doctrine of these panyis not liable for damages at the suit
cases has since been followed both in of one of its employees, for injuries reEngland and the United States. Skip v. ceived in a collision between two trains,
when such collision is caused by the gross
England Eastern Counties Railway Co.,
9 Excl. 223 ; State v. Afalster, 57 Md. negligence of those in charge of one of
287 ; Blake v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 70 Ill. the trains. Bull v. Mobile, 4-c., Ry. Co.,
60 ; Gravelle v. Minn. 4-c., Ry. Co., 3 67 Ala. 206 ; Cldcago, 4-c., By. Co. v.
McCrary 352; Beilfus v. N. Y. Cent. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977.
In Stringluum v.
By., 29 Hun 556; Rolback v. Pacific Steuart, 64 How. Pr. 5, the plaintiff, a
By., 43Mn. 187; Wonder v. B. 4- 0. servant of the defendant, was injured by
By. Co., 32 311. 411; Summerhays v. the failing of an elevator used to hoist
Kan. Pa. Ry. Co., 2 Col. 484; Yeomans grain into a storage building. The acciv. Contra Costa Co. Co., 44 Cal. 71 ; dent was occasioned by the negligence of
Brothers v. Cartter, 52 Mo. 372 ; Quincy the engineer in charge, in allowing the
LIABILITY

GENCE

OF MASTER

FOR NIEGLT-

OF FEnLLOW-SERvANT.-The

Mining Co. v. Kitts, 42 Mich. 34; C., B.
J- Q. Ry. v. Clark, 2 Brad. 596; Mur-

elevator to be carried too high, thereby
breaking the rope by which it was raised.
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The defendant was held not liable. As
to what is a sufficient averment of the
negligence of a fellow-servant, see ilelrrieh v. lWilliwtms, S4 In-. 553. But a
,iaster is not relieved from liability in all
•ases when a servant is injured by the
:egligence of a fellow-serant, but only
wvhere the servants are engaged in the
aine common employment ; that is, in
J~e same department of duty, not in departments essentially foreign to each
other. King v. Ohio, 4-c., By. Co., 14
Fed. It. 277. For instances in which
the master has been held liable, see Texas
If. R. Co. v. lVhmitore, 58 Tex. 276 ;
Shcmhan v. X. Y. Cent. Ry. Co., 91 N.
Y. 332.
In Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Cnimruings,
106 U. S. 700, the plaintiff in the course
of his employment as an engine driver
for the defendant, was injured by the
collision of the train on which lie was,
with another train.
leld, that if the
negligence of the defendant had a share
in causing the injuries to plaintiff, itwas
liable, notwithstanding the contributory
neglirence of his fellow-servant.
Where the liability of a railway company for injury to one of its track repairers, by the careless manner of running a
train, is in issue, evidence tending to
show that the train causing the injury
was in charge of a conductor and an
engineer, and was at the time engaged in
a race at a high and dangerous rate of
speed with a train on a parallel road,
over several public crossings, on a curve
on which the track repairer was at work,
in the city limits, and where trains should
be run with care corresponding with the
circumstances, without sound of bell or
whistle, or slack of speed, or any other
precaution to warn the men employed at
work on the track of approaching danger, is competent to go to the jury, and
should be submitted to it under proper
instructions, and it is error to grant a
nonsuit on the assumption that the negligence and carelessness causing the injury
was that of a co-employee in the same

service, and net that of the company.
Dick v. Pailay Co., 38 Ohio St. 390.
In some states the common-law rule
has been changed by statute, so far as
employees of railways are concerned.
Pyne v. C., B. 5" Q. R.y. Co., 54 Iowa
223 ; Dilbernerv. Chicago, ,-c., Ail. Co.,
47 Wis. 138 ; Union Trust Co. v. Thoinason, 25 Ran. I ; Peterson v. IV. Coal ,J
-1. Co., 50 Iowa 674 ; A1o. Pacific Bty.
Co. v. Haley, 25 Kan. 35. In the latter
case it was held that a person employed
upon a construction train to carry water
for the men working with the train, and
to gather up the tools and put them in
the caboose or tool car, was within the
statute making railway companies liable
to their employees for injuries resulting
from the negligence of co-employees, who
under the Iowa statute are to be regarded
as engaged in the operation of a railway.
See Schroeder v. C. R. Ry. Co., 47 Iowa
375 ; Loatbard v. C., 6-c., Ry., Id.494 ;
Smith v. B. C., 4-c., By. Co., 59 Id. 73.
As to time general rule, as was said by
Mr. Justide HARLAN, in Hough v. Railway Co., 100 U. S. 214, "very little
conflict of opinion is to be found in the
adjudged cases, where the court has been
at liberty to consider it upon principle,
uncontrolled by statutory regulations.
The difficulty has been in its practical
application to the special circumstances
of particular cases. What are the natural
and ordinary risks incident to the work
in which the servant engages ? what are
the perils which, in legal contemplation,
are presumed to be adjusted in the stipulated compensation ? who, within the
true sense of the rule, or upon grnunds
of public policy, are to be deemed ' fellow-servants' in the same common employment or undertaking-are questions
in reference to which much contrariety
of opinion exists in the courts of the
several states. Many of the cases are
very wide apart in the solution of those
questions."
W sO ARE

FELLOW

SERVANTS.-A

"fellow servant," within the meaning of
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the general rule, is usually, held to be any
one serving the same master in the same
common employment, and under his control, whether equal, inferior or superior
in his grade or standing, Thus an overseer is a fellow-servant of the laborer
under his charge : Brown v. Winona, &c.,
Ri,., 27 Minn. 162. A mere foreman
anl workman under him are fellow-servants: Feltham v. England, L. R., 2 Q.
B. 33; Keystone Bridge Co. v. Newberry,
96 Penn. St. 246; C. 4- T. By. Co. v.
.Snnmons, 11 Brad. 1.47 ; Daubert v.
Pickel. 4 Mo- App.'591 ; Both v. Peters,
55 Wis. 405 : Peterson v. I. Coal 43in. Co., 50 Iowa 674.
The following have been held to be
fellow-servants : A laborer engaged in
the service of a city and the foreman
over him: McDermott v. Boston, 133
Mass. 349. A foreman of a lock who
was engaged in superintending the raising of a vessel in the lock, and a laborer
in the same work. See also McDonald
y. Elagle, 6-c., Co., 67 Ga. 761 ; s. o. 68
Id. 839. A switch tender, and an engineer ; C., R. L, 4-c., By. Co. v. Henry,
7 Br d. 322. A detective employed to
watch a track, and those running trains:

Pyne v. C., B. 4- Q. By. Co., 54 Iowa
223. A track repairer and a brakeman:
Holden v. Fitchburg By. Co., 129 Mass.
268.
A yard switchman, and a car
inspector: Gibson v. N. C. By. Co., 22
Hun 289. A yard-master and his associate: McCosker v. Long Id. By. Co.,
84 N. Y. 77. A fireman and a brakeman on the same train: Greenwaldv. .A.
H., 6-c., By. Co., 49 Mich. 197 ; Nashville C., 4-c., By. Co. v. Wheless, 10
Lea (Tenn.)741 ; S.0. 43 Am. R. 317.
A conductor and a brakeman: Thayer v.
St. L., 4-c., By. Co., 22 Ind. 26 ; Smith
v. T. P. M. By. Co., 46 Mich. 258.
Engineer and telegraph operator, under
certain circumstances: Dana v. N. Y.
Cent. By., 23 HIn 473. Engineer and
brakeman: Railway Co. v. Banney, 37
Ohio St. 665. The runner of a steamengine employed in lowering material

il

and hoisting rock, in sinking a shaft, and
the men in the shaft engaged in excavating and loading the rock to be hoisted:
Buckley v. Gould, J-c., Co., 8 Sawyer C.
C. 395 ; s. c. 14 Fed. R. 833 and note.
Yard hand and person employed to strip
engines: C. d- N. W. By. Co. v. Scheuring, 4 Brad. 534. A "mining boss"
and a "drain boss." Lehigh 'al. By.
Co. v. Jones. 86 Pa. St. 433. A journeyman carpenter and bridge builder,
and one laboring with him and directing
the job. Yager v. Atlantic, 4-c., By.,
4 Hughes 192.
Superintendent, who
received half of the profits, and one employed as a laborer. Zeiqlerv. Day, 123
Mass. 152. A road master, whose duty
it was to turn the switch, and the fireman
and engineer. Walker v. B. 4- M. By.
Co., 128 Mass. 8. Miller v. B. 6- Il.
By. Id. Coupler of ears and an engineer. Valterz v. 0. 6- M. Ry. Co.,
85 Ill. 500. "Mining bosses" and miners under the provisions of the Mine
Ventilation Act of 1870. Del., 4-c., Canal Co. v. Carroll, 89 Pa. St. 374. Laborer employed in hoisting coal by machinery, and engineer tending the engine
running the same. Wood v. New Bedford
Coal Co., 121 Mass. 252. Primafacie a
person employed to superintend the diggingof a trench,and thelaborers employed
to dig it. Flynn v. Salem, 134 Mass.
351 ; Floyd v. Sugden, 134 Mass. 563.
See generally as to who are fellowservants---Lovegrove v. L., 4-c., Ry. Co.,
16 C. B. (N. S.) 669 ; Ielly v. Johnson, 128 Mass. 530; Crispin v. Babbitt,
81 N. Y. 516 ; Nat. Tube Works v.
Bedell, 96 Pa. St. 175 ; Keystone Bridge
Co. v. Kennedy, Id. 246; Wiggett
v. Fox,. 11 Exch. 832; Barringer v.
Del., 6-c., Canal Co., 19 Hun. 216 ; McAndrews v. Burns, 39 N. J. L. 117 ;
Albro v. Agiam, 4-c., Co., 6 Cash. 75;
Railway Co. v. Lewis, 33 Ohio St. 196.
Whether a stevedore and a laborer are
fellow-servants held, under the circumstances, a fact for the jury. ffiullan v.
P. 4- C. Steamship Co., 78 Ill. 25; s. o.
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21 Am. Rep. 2; Hass Y. P. &' C. Steamslp Co., 88 Pa. St. 269. See also
Shftdd v. Moran, 10 Brad. 618.
The fhc that a forcman was, under
certain circtunatances, allowed to hire
and discharge men, does not of itself
make hini the agent of the principal.
'Hamilton v. Iron, ,Jc., Co., 4 Mo. App.
564. Nor does the fact that one employee npon a railway is hired and discharged by one superior agent and
another by another, affect the relation of
the emlloyees to each other as fMlliwservant,.
Slattr v. Jewett, 85 1!& 61 ;
s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 627. Where a railway company leases of another company
its track, the traips of the lessee being
allowed to run over such track, subject
to the control, rules and orders of the
lessor, by virtue of an agreement to that
effect between the companies, the lessor
will be regarded as the common master
of the servants of the lessee, while running its trains on the leased track, and
the employees of the two companies as
fellow-servants of the lessor. C., B. ,&
Q. lRy. Co. v. Clark, 2 Brad. 596.
In Sinith v. Dint, 6-c., Ry. CJo., 46
Mich. 258, a brakeman in coupling cars
had his arm crushed by a loosened deadwood which had come from another road.
It was the business of inspectors employed on both roads to see that cars
transferred were in proper condition.
Held, that the car inspector was a fellowservant of the brakeman, and that the
latter could not recover from the rJjLay
company.
A railway company is not liable for
injuries inflicted through the negligence
of its servants, upon a stranger to the
company while engaged in the voluntary
service of the company in uncoupling the
cars, if by his -egligence lie contributed
to the injury: N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112; s. c. 12 Am. Rep.
356 ; see Fower v. Penn. R. R. Co., 69
Pa. St. 210; Dagg v. Midland Ry. Co.,
1 Hurlst. & N. 772.
In Beilfus v. N. Y., 6-c., Ry. Co., 29

HIm 556, a wrecking train had been
sent out under charge of one S., who
was employed by the railway company
to superintend the removing of wrecks,
under the orders of the person in charg
of the shops and yards. While the car,
were being replaced the plaintiff's intetate was killed by the upsetting of [lie
car, which was caused by an improper
and negligent order given by S. 1leld,
that S. was a fellow-servant of the deceased, and that the company was not
responsible for his negligence.
In Howland v. L. S. 6- If. Ry. Co.,
226
- the plaintiff, while going,
54 Wis.
as a shoveler of snow for the defendant
company, upon a train engaged in removing snow from the track, was injured
by the overturning of the car in which
he rode, by reason of an unsuccessful
attempt of the conductor to remove a
snow-bank from the track by means of the
snow-plow alone, aided by the momentum of the train. Held, that a recovery
by the plaintiff was precluded by the fact
that such overturning of his car was one
of the perils of the business which he
assumed, and that the conductor and
others whose negligence was alleged
were fellow-servants in the same employment.
In Searle v. Lindsay, 11 (C. B. (N. S.)
429, the plaintiff was engaged as third
engineer on board a steam vessel, and
while employed with others under order
of the chief engineer in turning a winch,
one of the handles came off in consequence of the machinery being, through
the negligence of the chief engineer, in a
defective and unsafe condition, and the
plaintiff was seriously injured. Held,
that the owners were not liable.
Where the service of workmen is
divided into different departments and
each department committed to distinct
bodies of workmen, an injury to a servant 6f one class resulting from the
negligence of a servant in the other class,
will entitle the servant injured to invoke
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Bat
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where the different classes of work ar
committed to the whole body of workmen without regard to its character, they
are fellow-servants, and the employer is
not liable. 'Whether in any given case
the two species of service form two departments, or one, is a question of fact for
the jury. Holton v. Daly, 4 Brad. 25.
WHO ARE NOT FELLOW-SERVANTS.-

Whoever exercises the power of appointing and removing employees or servants,
though his grade of employment as to
other matters makes him their fellowservant, exercises a corporate function
and renders the corporation liable for his
negligence. Tyson v. S. 4-N. Al. By.
Co., 61 Ala. 554. A superintendent who
employs and discharges the laborers and
employees is not a fellow-servant of
theirs, but represents the master. Mhlitchell
v. Robinson, 80 Ind. 281.
The following have been held not to
he fellow-servants: A fireman and a
master of a vessel. The Classop, 7 Sawver C. 0. 274. An employee in charge
of a train, and an employee in the
ecnpany's carpenter shop. Ryan v.
Chicago 4- North Western By. Co., 60
I1. 171. A track repairer and a fireman. C. 4- N. W. Ry. Co. v. Mforanda,
93 I1. 302. Persons engaged in loading
cars with freight and switch tender. C.,
R. I., 4-c., By. v. Henry, 7 Brad. 322.
To the same effect is: Whalon v. Centenuary Church, 62 Mo. 327 ; Gornly v.
VulcanIron W'orks, 61 Mo. 492; Beeson
v. Green Mr., 4-c., Ry. Co., 57 Cal. 20;
Walker v. Boiling, 22 Ala. 294 ; Devany
v. Vulcan Iron Works, 4 Mo. App. 236 ;
Devine v. Tarrytown, 6-c., Co., 22 Hun
26.
Engineer of train carrying day
laborers to work, and such laborers.
Russell v. Hudson R. By. Co., 5 Duer
39. But contra, Ryan v. C. F. By. Co.,
23 Pa. St. 384 ; Gillshannon v. S. B.
Ry. Co.. 10 Cush. 228. A general foreman who has full charge and supervision
of a work, who makes out the pay-roll,
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engages and discharges men, and the
laborers under "him. Eagan v. Tucker,
18 Hun 347. To the same efi'ct is:
Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13 ; s. c.
41 Am. Rep. 298 ; Schult: v. C. 31., 6-c.,
By. Co., 48 Wis. 375 ; Brabbitts v. C. 4N. W. Ry., 38 Id. 289. See note to
.3falone v. Hathaway, 21 Am. Rep. 579 ;
Hiller v. Union Pa. ?y., 17 Fed. R.
67 ; Gravelle v. Minneapolis, 4'c., By.
Co., 3 McCrary C. C. 352. A day
laborer on the track of a railway, and
an engine driver. T. W., 4-c., By. Co.
v. O'Connor, 77 Ill. 391. A mitfing
captain, having the entire management
of the mine, and a laborer in the mine.
Ryan v. Bagaley, 50 Mich. 179; 45
Am. Rep. 35. Workmen employed by
cotton manufacturing company to keep
the machinery of the mill in repair, and
a weaver in the factory.
Gunter v.
Graniteville, 4-c., Company, 18 S. C.
263.
1The rule of respondent superior applies where an employee of a railway
company is injured by reason of the
negligence of another employee of the
same company, engaged in a separate
and distinct department, having no immediate connection with that in which
the injured employee is engaged. N.,
&-c., By. Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.)
347.
In Ohio it is well settled that where
one servant is placed by his employer in
a position of subordination to, and subject to the orders and control of others,
and such inferior servant, without fault,
and while in the discharge of his duties,
is injured by the negligence of the superior servant, the master is liable: Berea
Stone Co. v. Kraft, 31 Ohio St. 292;
Bailway Co. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415;
C. C., 6-c., By. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St.
201; 1l. B., 5-c., Ry. v. Barber, 5 Id.
541; P. 4- Ft., 4-c., By. Co. v. Devinney, 17 Id. 197. See also Lake
Shore, 4-c., By. Co. v. Lavalley, 36 Ohio
St. 221.
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A section foreman, whose duty it is to
keep tle track in repair and free from
obutructions, in this particular represents
the company, and is not a fellow-servant
with a switchn
; all v. iMo. Pacific
Ry. Co., 74 Mo. 29S. This rule was laid
down in Lewis v. Ry. Co., 59 Mo. 495,
and has since been Ibllowecd in tile
Miso(ri courts.
In Abraham v. Reynolds, 5 Hurlst. &
N. 143, tile
plaintiff, a servant of J. &
Co., who were employed by the defendants to carry cotton from a warehouse,
was receiving the cotton into his lorry,
when, in consequence of the negligence
of defendants' porter in lowering the
bales from the tipper floor of tile
warehouse, a bale fell upon him. Held, that
the plaintiff and defendants' servant not
being under the same control, or forming
part of the same establishment, were not
so employed on a common object as to
deprive the plaintiff of a right of action
against the defendants for such negligence.
In Baird v. Pettit, 70 Pa. St. 447.
the plaintiff was employed as a draftsman in the defendant's locomotive works.
A carpenter employed in "jobbing" for
defendant in any part of the warehouse,
was by the direction of the defendant,
superintending the excavation of a cellar
under the building, employing hands,
etc. He had a large pile of dirt thrown
on the public walk.
The plaintiff, in
leaving the house in the dark after ceasing work, fell over the dirt an'was
injured. Held, that they were not fellowservants and that the defendants were
liable. Beld, further, that the plaintiff
having ceased work and left the shop,
the relation of master and servant had
ceased, and the defendant was liable to
him as to any other citizen.
As to when employee deemed alterego
of master, see generally, Foues v. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17 ; Hart v. N. Y., J-c.,
Dock Co., 48 Supr. Ct. 460; Dwy," v.
Am. Ex. Co., 55 Wis. 453; JJ,,bbin
v. R y. Co., 81 N. C. 447.

MODIFICATION

OF

THE

GENERAL

RULE.-TO the general rule of law that
the master is not responsible to one servant for an injury occasioned by the
negligence of a co-servant of the common
employer, there are two well-defined exceptions :
First.-Where the servant whose negligence caused the injury was an unfit
and incompetent person to be intrusted
with the duty to which he was assigned,
and the accident resulted from his incompetency and unfitness ; Dtining v. iV. Y.
Cent. By. Qo., 49 N. Y. 521.
Second.-Where the accident resulted
from unsafe and imperfect machinery,
and appliances, furnished for tile use of
the servant in the master's business ;
Laning v. N. Y. Cent. Ry. Co., supra;
Flil:e v. Boston 6- Alb. Ry Co., 53 N. Y.
550; Fuller v. Jewett$ 80 N. Y. 46.
These exceptions, however, are subject
to the qualification that the duty imposed
upon the master to furnish competent
servants, and to fmnish fit and safe machinery, is not absolute, but relative.
The master does not guarantee either the
competency of the co-servants or the
satety of the machinery: G. H., 6-c.,
Ry. Co. v. Delahunty, 53 Tex. 206 ; C.
- N. TV. Ry. Co. v. Scheuring, 4 Brad.
533; Slater v. Jewett, 85 N. Y. 61 ;
C. 4- N. W. Ry. Co. v. Bragonier, 11
Brad. 517 ; Buckley v. Gould, 4-c., Co.,
8 Sawy. C. C. 395 ; s.c. 14 Fed. R. 833.
He undertakes to use due and reasonable care in both respects: Murphy v.
Boston, 6-c., By. Co., 88 N. Y. 146;
Kain v. Smith, 25 Hun 146; Lambert
v. Mckel, 4 Mo. App. 590 ; Colton v.
Richards, 123 Mass. 484; Ala. 6- Fa.
By. Co. v. Walker, 48 Ala. 460; Tyson v. S. 4- N. A. By. Co., 61 Ala.
554; fIcDonald v. Hazletine, 53 Cal.
35 ; H. 4 T. C. Ry. v. Meyers, 55 Tex.
110 ; .Currow v. ilerchants' M1anufacturing Co., 135 Mass. 374 ; King v. Ohio,

4-'., By. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 277.
DUTY

OF

MASTER

GENERALLY.-

The duty of the master to the servant, or
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his implied contract with his servant, is
admirably described by FOLGER, J., in
Laning v. N.
. Cent. Ry., 49 N. Y.
532. Said lhe: "That duty or contract
is to the result that the servant shall be
nnder no risk from imperfect or inadequate machinery, or other material means
and appliances, or from unskilful or incompetent fellow-servants of any grade.
It is a duty or contract to be affirmatively and positively performed, and there
is not a performance of it until there has
been placed for the servant's use, perfect
and adequate physical means, and for his
helpmates fit and competent fellow-servants; or due care used to that end.
That some general agent clothed with the
power, and charged with the duty to
make performance for the master, has not
done his duty at all, or has not done it
well, neither shows a performance by the
master, nor excuses the master's nonperformance,-when it is done, and not
till then, is his duty met or his contract
kept. The servant here takes the risk
of the negligence of his fellows in the use
of the materials and implcments furnished, and of their failure from latent
defects not revealed by practical tests,
and from deterioration by the usual wear
and tear. * * * * The principals may
not avoid the duty which they owe to
their servants of furnishing them with
sound mechanical contrivances, and accompanying them with competent fellows,
by conferring upon superior servants the
duty of selecting and hiring. The duty
being that of the principals, and theirs
the contract, it is theirs to fulfil and
perform, and if it is not done, or insufficiently done, the failure to do so is theirs.
As is well said, 'if a master's knowledge
of defects be unnecessary to his liability,
the more he neglects his business and
abandons it to others, the less will he be
liable.' (BYLES, J., in Holmesv. Clerk,
W. R. 405)."
The fact that a servant became negligent after he had been employed, does
not, without other evidence, show negli-

gence in the master in selecting.

Mc-

Donald v. The Eagle, 6-c., Co., 67 Ga.
761 ; s. c. 68 Ga. 839. See generally
as to the duty of master, Drynala v.
Thompson et al., 26 Minn. 40; Ilailicay
Co. v. Dunham, 49 Texas 181 ; Blake v.
Me. Cent. Ry. Co., 70 Me. 60 ; Jordan
v. Wells, 3 Woods 527 ; Tex. .1. R. Co.
;r. Whitnore, 58 Tex. 276; Jones v.
Mills, 126 Mass. 84; Lawler v. Androscoggin .Ry. Co., 62 Me. 463; 16 Am.
R. 492; O'Connell v. B. ,& 0. R;. Co.,
20 Md. 212; Shauck'v. X. C. Rsy. Co.,
25 Id. 462; Smith v. Steele, L. R.,
10Q. B. 125; 11 Eng. R. 194; Howd
v. Miss. Cent. By. Co., 50 Miss. 178.
If the negligence of a railway company
is the efficient cause of the injury, it is
liable, although the servant may have
been himself in some default, and might
have escaped injury by the exercise of
extraordinary care. N., 6-c., Ry. Co. v.
Carroll, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 348.
A railway company cannot contract in
advance with its employees for the waiver
and release of the liability imposed. Kan.
Pa. Ry. v. Peavey, 29 Kan. 169; s. c.
44 Am. R. 630.
Where a servant engaged in the operation of machinery, by reason of his youth
and inexperience, is not awaie of the
danger to which he is expoged, it is the
duty of his master to warn him if he himself knows of it, and this notwithstanding
the existence of that which renders the
machinery dangerous is known to the
servant. Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13.
See also Hamilton v. G., t., 6-c., Ry.,
54 Tex. 556.

DUTY OF THE MASTER TO SELECT
AND RETAIN COPETENT FELLOW-SERVANS.-If the master is guilty of negligence in the employment of a fellow-servant, or, after notice, continuing in his
employment an incompetent servant, he
is liable.
Ohio 4- Mississippi Ry. Co.
v. Collara, 73 Ind. 261 ; Marshall v.
,Sricker, 63 Mo. 309; M41cAndrew v.
Burns, 39 N. J. 117 ; Walker v. Bolling,
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22 Ala. 294; Trazhcr v. Penn. Ry., 38
Pa. St. 104 ; Pittsbg., ,Ve'., Ry. Co. v.
Ruby, 38 Ind. 294 ; McDermott v. Bcston, 133 Mass. 349 ; 11. j- T., 6-c., Ry.
v. Willis, 53 Tex. 318.
As to what is sufficient evidence of the
competency of a servant, see Gibson v.
. C. Ry. Co., 22 Hun 288; llar'ey
v. N. Y5 Cent. Ry. Co., 88 N. Y. 481 ;
Fones v. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17 ; [urphy
v. St. L., Jc., Ry., 71 Mo. 202.
A master is liable for his negligence in
failing to furnish a suflicient number of
servants to insure safety. Hardy v. Cent.
Ry., 76 N. C. 5.
Permission given by a railvay company to an engineer to allow a fircman to
act as engineer when competent, makes
the company liable for a mistake or negligence of the engineer in permitting a
fireman to handle the engine when incompetent for duty. 11arper v. Wood, 47
Mo. 567; 14 Am. R. S53. See also
Ohio ,J-Miss. Ry. v. Collarn, 73 Ind.
261.
Where a conductor is habitually intemperate and unfit for service, and his
habits and unfitness are known to the
railway company, it is liable to his fellow-servants for his negligence. Huntingdon, 6-c., Ry. Co. v. Decker, 84 Ill.
419.
As to the liability of connecting lines
of railway to employee, see Phil., 6-c.,
Ry. Co. v. State, 58 Md. 373.

The fact that an employee was killed
in consequence of defective machinery,
will not of itself make out a ease against
his employer. It must be shown that the
employer was aware of the defect, or
that by reasonable care it could have
been diqcovered. Elliott v. St. L., 6-c.,
Ry., 67 Mo. 272.
The master is liable for defective machinery, although the negligence of a
fellow-servant contributed to the injury.
.Mcifahon v. Henning, 1 MeCrary 516 ;
Kain v. Smith, 25 Ran. 146 ; Cone v.
Del., &c., By., 81 N. Y. 206.
If the master has provided suitable
material and machinery, he is not liable
for the negligence or error in judgment
of any of the servants in selecting and
using them, provided they are of adequate
skill and careful, prudent persons.
Harms v. Sulliran, 1 Brad. 251 ; Ilolden
v. i1 tchburg By. Co., 129 M,1ass. 268 ;
.Marvinv. Muller, 25 Hun 163 ; Floyd
v. Sugden, 134 Mass. 563; Collins v. St.
P., 6-c., Ry., 30 Minn. 31.

DUTY OF SERVANT.-A servant must
not have been guilty of negligence in
order to recover. M11cDade v. Ga. Ry.
Co., 60 Ga. 119; Cowles v. Ry. Co., 84
N. C. 309 ; Khenney v. Cent. Ry., 61 Ga.
590 ; Day v. Toledo, 6-c., Ry., 42 Micb.
523. If the employee have knowledge
of imperfect machinery and continues
using it, lie cannot recover. H.,4 T. C.
Ry. v. Myers, 55 Tex. 110. And if he
have knowledge of an habitual and conDUTY OF MASTER TO FURNISH SAFE
tinued negligence of his employer and
MAcIttNERY.-A master must provide
his servants with safe and suitable ma- acquiesces therein, and continues in his
chincry and appliances necessary for their service without objection or effort to corwork, and must also keep them in repair. rect it, he waives his rights. Ry. Co. v.
Laning v. N. Y Cent. Ry., 40 N. Y. Knittal, 33 Ohio St. 468 ; Frazier v.
Penn. Ry. Co., 38 Pa. St. 104.
521; K'ke v. B. ,4 A. Ry., 53 N. Y.
It is the duty of the servant to give
550; Lsure v. Graniteville, 6-c., Ry.
Co., 18 S. C. 296; Cowles v. Ry. Co., notice of a defect in machinery, or of the
84 N. C. 309 ; Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. incompetency of a fellow-servant, if lie
Cowles v.
59 ; Gallagherv. Piper, 16 C. B. (N. have knowledge of either.
S.) 669 ; ,1fulchey v. Methodist R. S., Railway Co., supra; But where the
125 Mass. 487 ; Green v. Banta, 48 N. employee is so grossly and notoriously
Y. Supr. Ct. 156.
unfit that not to know of his unfitness is

COMMONWEALTH v. FRANKLIN PIERCE.
negligence, the law presumes notice to
the employer.
C. 6- R. L Ry. Co. v.
Doyle, 18 Kan. 59.
An employee must make reasonable
use of his faculties to avoid danger or
injury in the course of his employment.
Hughes v. Winona, S-c., Ry., 27 Minn.

137. And if he voluntarily exposes himself to danger that he knows, or by reasonable attention might know, he assumes
all risks thereto. Chicago 6. T. By. v.
Simmons, II Brad. 147.
CiAnLas L. BILLINGS.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of 3Jfassachusetts.
COMMONWEALTH v. FRANKLIN PIERCE.
To constitute manslaughter where there is no evil intent it is not necessary that
the killing should be the result of an unlawful act ; it is sufficient if it is tie result
of reckless or foolhardy presumption, judged by the standard of what would be
reckless in a man of ordinary prudence under the same circumstances.
The defendant, who publicly practised as a physician, being called upon to attend
a sick woman, caused her with her consent to be kept in flannels saturated with kerosene for three days, by reason of which she died. There was evidence that he had
made similar applications with favorable results in other eases, but that in one the
ldd, that the
effect had been to blister and burn the flesh, as in the present case.
juryhaving found that the application was made as the result of foolhardypresumption or gross negligence, a conviction of manslaughter was proper.
Commonwealth v. Tmnpson, 6 Mass. 134, criticised.

THE facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
HOLMES, J.-The defendant has been found guilty of manslaughter on evidence that he publicly practised as a physician, and,
being called to attend a sick woman, caused her, with her consent,
to be kept in flannels saturated with kerosene for three days, more
or less, by reason of which she died. There was evidence that he
had made similar applications with favorable results in other cases,
but that in one the effect had been te blister and burn the flesh as
in the present case.
The main questions which have been argued before us are raised
by the fifth and sixth rulings requested on behalf of the defendant,

but refused by the court, and by the instructions given upon the
same matter. The fifth request was, shortly, that the defendant
must have "so much knowledge or probable information of the fatal
tendency of the prescription that [the death] may be reasonably
presumed by the jury to be the effect of obstinate, wilful rashness,
and not of an honest intent and expectation to cure." The seventh
request assumes the law to be as thus stated. The sixth request
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was as ibllows: " If the defendant made the prescription with an
honest purpose and intent to cure the deceased, he is not guilty
of this offence, however gross his ignorance of the quality and tendency of the remedy prescribed, or of the nature of the disease, or
of both." The eleventh request was substantially similar, except
that it was confined to this indictment.
The court instructed the jury that "it is not necessary to show
an evil intent ;" that "if by gross and reckless negligence be caused
the death, he is guilty of culpable homicide ;" that "the question
is whether the kerosene (if it was the cause of the death), either in
its original application, renewal, or continuance, was applied as the
result of foolhardy presumption or gross negligence on the part
of the defendant ;" and that the defendant was "to be tried by no
other or higher standard of skill or learning than that which he
necessarily assumed in treating her; that is, that he was able to do
so without gross recklessness or foolhardy presumption in undertaking it." In other words, that the defendant's duty was not enhanced
by any express or implied contract, but that he was bound at his
peril to do no grossly reckless act when he intermeddled with the
person of another, in the absence of any emergency or other exceptional circumstances.
The defendant relies on the case of Commonwealth v. Thompson,
6 Mass. 134, from which his fifth request is quoted in terms. Iis
argument is based on another quotation from the same opinion:
" To constitute manslaughter, the killing must have been a consequence of some unlawful act. Now there is no law which prohibits
any man from prescribing for a sick person with his consent,.if
he honestly intends to cure him by his prescription." This language isambiguous, and we must begin by disposing of a doubt
to which it might give rise. If it means that the killing must be
the consequence of an act which is unlawful for independent reasons apart from its likelihood to kill, it is wrong. Such may once
have been the law, but for a long time it has been just as fully, and
latterly, we may add, much more willingly, recognised that a man
may commit murder or manslaughter by doing otherwise lawful
acts recklessly, as that he may by doing acts unlawful for independent reasons, from which death accidentally ensues: 3 Inst. 57; 1
Hale P. C. 472-477; 1 Hawk. P. 0. c. 29, §§ 3, 4, 12; c. 31,
§§ 4-6; Foster 262, 263, Homicide, c. 1, § 4; B1. Comm. 192,
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197; 1 East P. 0. 260 et seq.; Hull's Case, Kelyng 40, and cases
cited below.
But recklessness in a moral sense means a certain state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts. No
matter whether defined as indifference to what those consequences
may be, or as a failure to consider their nature or probability as
fully as the party might and ought to have done, it is understood
to depend on the actual condition of the individual's mind with
regard to consequences, as distinguished from mere knowledge of
present or past flacts or circumstances from which some one, or
everybody, else might be led to anticipate or apprehend them if the
supposed act were done. We have to determine whether recklessness in this sense was necessary to make the defendant guilty of
felonious homicide, or whether his acts are to be judged by the
external standard of what would be morally reckless under the circumstances known to him in a man of reasonable prudence.
More specifically, the questions raised by the foregoing requests
and rulings are whether an actual good intent and the expectation
of good results are an absolute justification of acts, however foolhardy they may be, if judged by the external standard supposed,
and whether the defendant's ignorance of the tendencies of kerosene
administered as it was will excuse the administration of it.
So far as civil liability is concerned, at least, it is very clear that
what we have called the external standard would be applied, and
that, if a man's conduct is such as would be negligent in a man of
ordinary prudence, it is negligent in him. Unless he can bring himself within some broadly defined exception to general rules, the law
deliberately leaves his idiosyncrasies out of account, and peremptorily assumes that he has as much capacity to judge and to foresee
consequences as a man of ordinary prudence would have in the
same situation. In the language of TINDAL, 0. J., " Instead,
therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be coextensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as
variable as the length of the foot of each individual, we ought
rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to
caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe :"
Vaughan v. iltenlove, 4 Bing. N. 0. 468, 475; S. c. 4 Scott 244.
If this is the rule adopted in regard to the redistribution of losses,
which sound policy allows to rest where they fall in the absence of
a clear reason to the contrary, there would seem to be at least

COMMONWEALTH

v. FRANKLIN PIERCE.

equal reason for adopting iT in the criminal law, which has for its
immediate object and task to establish a general standard, or at
least general negative limits, of conduct for the community, in the
interest of the safety of all.
There is no denying, however, that Commonwealth v. Thompson, although possibly distinguishable from the present case upon
the evidence, tends very strongly to limit criminal liability more
narrowly than the instructions given. But it is to be observed
that the court did not intend to lay down any new law. They
cited and meant to follow the statement of Lord HALE, 1 P. C.
429, to the effect " that if a physician, whether licensed or not,
gives a person a potion, without any intent of doing him any bodily
hurt, but with intent to cure or prevent a disease, and contrary to
the expectation of the physician it kills him, he is not guilty of
murder or manslaughter :" 6 Mass. 141. We think that the court
fell into the mistake of taking Lord HALE too literally. Lord
HALE himself admitted that other persons might make themselves
liable by reckless conduct: 1 P. 0. 472. We doubt if he meant
to deny that a physician might do so as well as any one else. He
has not been so understood in later times: Rex v. Lonq, 4 0. &
His text is
P. 423, 436; Webb's Case, 2 Lewin 196, 211.
simply an abridgment of 4 Inst. 251. Lord COKE there cites the
Mirror, c. 4, § 16, with seeming approval, in favor of the liability.
The case cited by HALE does not deny it: Fitz. Abr. Corone, pl.
163. Another case of the same reign seems to recognise it. Y.
B. 43 Ed. III. 33, pl. 38, where Thorp said that he had seen one
indicted for killing a man, whom he had undertaken to cure, by
want of care. And a multitude of modern cases have settled the
law accordingly in England: Rex v. Ililliamson, 3 0. & P. 635;
Tessymond's case, 1 Lewin 169 ; Ferguson's case, Id. 181 ; Rex
v. Simpson, Willeock Med. Prof., part 2, ccxxvii. ; Rex v. Long,
4 0. & P. 398 ; Rex v. Lonq, Id. 423; Rex v. Spiller, 5 0. & P
333; Rex v. Senior, 1 Moody 346; Webb's Case, 2 Lewin 196;
s. c. 1 M. & Rob. 405; The Queen v. Spilling, 2 Id. 107; Regina v. Whitehead, 3 0. & K. 202; Regina v. (rick, 1 F. & F.
356; Regina v. Crook, Id. 521; Regina v. lfarkuss, 4 Id. 356;
Regina v. Chamberlain, 10 Cox 0. 0. 486 ; Regina v. Maclead,
12 Id. 534. See also Ann v. State, 11 Humph. 159 ; State v.
Hardister, 38 Ark. 605; and the Massachusetts cases cited below.
If a physician is not less liable for reckless conduct than other
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people, the matter is clear in the light of admitted principle and the
later Massachusetts cases. In dealing with a man who has no
special training, the question whether his act would be reckless in
a man of ordinary prudence is evidently equivalent to an inquiry
into- the degree of danger which common experience shows to attend
the act under the circumstances known to the actor. The only difference is, that the latter inquiry is still more obviously external to
the estimate formed by the actor personally than the former. But
it is familiar law that an act causing death may be murder, manslaughter, or misadventure, according to the degree of danger
attending it. If the danger is very great, as in the case of an
assault with a weapon found by the jury to be deadly, or an assault
with hands and feet upon a woman known to be exhausted by illness, it is murder: Commonwealth v. Drew, 4 Mass. 391, 396 ;
Commonwealth v. Fox, 7 Gray 585. The doctrine is clearly stated
in 1 East P. 0. 262.
The very meaning of the fiction of implied malice in such cases
at common law was, that a man might have to answer with his life
for consequences which he neither intended nor foresaw. To say
that he was presumed to have intended them is merely to, adopt
another fiction, and to disguise the truth. The truth was, that his
failure or inability to predict them was immaterial, if, under the
circumstances known to him, the court or jury, as the case might
be, thought them obvious.
As implied malice signifies the highest degree of danger, and
makes the act murder; so, if thd danger is less, but still not so
remote that it can be disregarded, the act will be called reckless,
and will be manslaughter, as in the case of an ordinary assault with
feet and hands, or a weapon not deadly, upon a well person. Cases
of Drew and Fox, ubi supra. Or firing a pistol into the highway,
when it does not amount to murder: Burton's Case, I Strange
487. Or slinging a cask over the highway in a customary, but insufficient mode: Rigmaidon's Case,'l Lewin 180. See Hull's
Case, Kelyng 40. Or careless driving: Begina v. Timmins, 7
0. & P. 499; Regina v. Dalloway, 2 Cox C. 0. 273; Regina v.
Swindall, 2 0. & K. 230.
If the principle which has thus been established both for murderand manslaughter is adhered to, the defendant's intention to produce the oppo.ite result from that which came to pass, leaves him
in the same position with regard to the present charge that he
VOL. XXXIII.-16
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would have been in if he had had no intention at all in the matter.
We think that the principle must be adhered to, where, as here,
the assumption to act as a physician was uncalled for by any
sudden emergency, and no exceptional circumstances are shown;
and that we cannot recognise a privilege to do acts manifestly endangering human life, on the ground of good intentions alone.
We have implied, however, in what we have said, that it is
undoubtedly true, as a general proposition, that a man's liability
for his acts 'is determined by their tendency under the circumstances known to him, and not by their tendency under all the circumstances actually affecting the result, whether known or
unknown. And it may be asked why the dangerous character of
kerosene, or "the fatal tendency of the prescription," as it was put
in the fifth request, is not one of the circumstances the defendant's
knowledge or ignorance of which might have a most important
bearing on his guilt or innocence.
But knowledge of the dangerous character of a thing is only
the equivalent of foresight of the way in which it will act. We
admit that, if the thing is generally supposed to be universally
harmless, and only a specialist would foresee that in a given case
it would do damage, a person who did not foresee it, and who had
no warning, would not be held liable for the harm. If men were
held answerable for everything they did which was dangerous in
fact, they would be held for all their acts from which harm in fact
ensued. The use of the thing must be dangerous according to
common experience, at least to the extent that there is a manifest
and appreciable chance of harm from what is done, in view either
of the actor's knowledge or of his conscious ignorance. And therefore, again, if the danger is due to the specific tendencies of the
individual thing, and is not characteristic of the class to which it
belongs, which seems to have been the view of the common law
with regard to bulls, for instance, a person to be made liable must
have notice of some past experience, or, as is commonly said, "of
the quality of the beast." 1 Hale P. 0. 430. But if the dangers
are characteristic of the class according to common experience, then
he who uses an article of the class upon another cannot escape on
the ground that he had less than the common experience. Common
experience is necessary to the man of ordinary prudence, and a
man who assumes to act as the defendant did must have it at his
peril. When the jury are asked whether a stick of a certain size
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was a deadly weapon, they are not asked further whether the defendani knew that it was so. It is enough that he used and saw it such
as it was: Commonwealth v. Drew, ubi supra ; Commonwealth v.
Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 306. So as to an assault and battery by
the use of excessive force ; Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray 36.
So here. The defendant knew that he was using kerosene. The
jury have found that it was applied as the result of foolhardy presumption or gross negligence, and that is enough : Commonwealth
v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303, 305. Indeed, if the defendant had
known the fatal tendency of the prescription, he would have been
perilously near the line of murder: Regina v. Pa~kard, C. & MI.
It will not be necessary to invoke the authority of those
236.
exceptional decisions in which it has been held, with regard to
knowledge of the circumstances, as distinguished from foresight
of the consequences of an act, that, when certain of the circumstances were known, the party was bound at his peril to inquire
as to the others, although not of a nature to be necessarily inferred
from what were known: Commonwealth v. Hfallett, 103 Mass. 452;
Regina v. -Prince,L. R., 2 C. 0. 154; Commonwealth v. Farren,
9 Allen 489.
The remaining questions may be disposed of more shortly. When
the defendant applied kerosene to the person of the deceased in a
way which the jury have found to be reckless, or, in other words,
seriously and unreasonably endangering life according to common
experience, he did an act which his patient could not justify by her
consent, and which therefore was an assault notwithstanding that
consent: Commonwealth v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350; see Commonwealth v. Hink, 123 Mass. 422, 425. It is unnecessary to
rely on the principle of Commonwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303,
that fraud may destroy the effect of consent, although evidently
the consent in this case was based on the express or implied representations of the defendant concerning his experience.
As we have intimated above, an allegation that the defendant
knew of the deadly tendency of the kerosene was not only unnecessary, but improper: Regina v. Packard,ubi supra.- An allegation that the kerosene was of a dangerous tendency is superfluous,
although similar allegations are often inserted in indictments, it
being enough to allege the assault and that death did in fact result
from it. It would be superfluous in the case of an assault with a
staff, or where the death resulted from assault combined with expos-
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ure. See Commonwealth v. Afacloon," 101 Mass. 1. See further
the second count, for causing death by exposure, in Stockdale's
Case, 2 Lewin 220; Regina v. Smith, 11 Cox C. C. 210. The
instructions to the jury on the standard of skill by which the
defendant was to be tried, stated above, were as favorable to him
as he could ask.
The objection to evidence of the defendant's previous unfavorable experience of the use of kerosene is not pressed. The admission of it in rebuttal was a matter of discretion: Commonwealth
v. Blair, 126 Mass. 40.
Exceptions overruled.
Mr. Bishop, in his excellent work on
Criminal Law, vol. 1, 314 (7th ed.),
lays down the rule as to homicide from
carelessness, thus:
"Every act of gross carelessness, even
in the performance of what is lawful,
and &fortiori of what is not lawful, and
every negligent omission of legal duty,
whereby death ensues, is indictable either
as murder or manslaughter :" Rex v.
Carr, 8 C. & P. 163; Reg. v. B1aines,
2 C. & K. 368 ; Rex v. Sullivan, 7 C. &
P. 64 1 ; Errington'sCase, 2 Lewin 217 ;
Reg. v. Edwards, 8 C. & P. 611 ; Ann
v. State, 11 Humph. 159; U. S. v.
Freeman, 4 Mason 505 ; Castell v. Bambridqe, 2 Stra. 856 ; Rex v. Frai, 1
East P. C. 236; Reg. v. Marriott, 8 C.
P. 425; U. S. v. Warner, 4 McLean
463; Rex v. Smith, 2 C. & P. 449 ; I
East P. C. 264, 331 ; Hilton's Case, 2
Lewin 214; Reg. v. Barrett, 2 C. & K.
343; State v. Hloover, 4 Dev. & Bat.
365 ; Reg. v. Ellis, 2 C. & K. 470;
Etchderry v. Levielle, 2 Hilton 40; State
v. O'Brien, 3 Vroom 169; Reg. v.
Martin, 11 Cox C. C. 136.
"If a mn take upon himself an office
or duty requiring skill or care-if, by
Iris
ignorance, iarclessness or negligence,
he cause the death of another, lie
will be
guilty of manslaughter. * * * If a per-

son, whether a medical man or not,
profess to deal with the life or health
of another, he is bound to use competent
skill
and sufficient attention ; and if he

cause the death of another through a
gross want of either, he will be guilty
of manslaughter:" 1 Arch. Cr. Pr. &
Plead. *9, quoted by Mr. Bishop, I
Bish. Cr.' Law,
314; Reg. v Spiller,
5 C. & P. 333; Reg. v. Van Butchell,
3 Id. 629 ; Reg. v. Jlilliamson, Id. 635 ;
Reg. v. St. John Long, 4 Id. 398, 423;
Rex v. Webb, I Moody & R 405.
In vol. 2 of his work on Criminal
Law, 664, Mr. Bishop says:
"The doctrine as to physician and
patient is not quite the same in England
and the United States, and possibly it is
not harmonious among our states. According to English adjudication, whenever one undertakes to cure another of
disease, or to perform on him a surgical
operation, he renders himself thereby
liable to the criminal law, if he does not
carry to this duty some degree of skill,
though what degree may not be clear;
consequently, if the patient dies through
his ill treatment, he is indictable for
mansiaughter :" Rex v. Spiller, 5 C. &

P. 333; Fergirson'sCase, 1 Lewin 181 ;
Rex v. Senior, I Moody 346 ; Rez v.
Webb, 1 Moody & R. 405; 2 Lewin
196; Reg. v. Spilling, 2 Moody & I.
107; Rex v.Long, 4 C. &P. 398; Rex
v. Williamson. 3 C. & P. 635; Reg. V.
Jfar.ss, 4 Host. & F. 356; Reg. v.
Macleod, 12 Cox C. C. 534; Reg.
v. Chamberlain, 10 Id. 486; Regina
v. Spencer, Id. 525. " Still [says Mr.
Bishop in the same section], WILLES,
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once put the doctrine in a more
reasonable way, thus: 'If a man knew
that he was using medicines beyond his
knowledge, and was meddling with things
beyond his reach, that was culpable rashness. Negligence might consist in using
medicines in the use of which care was
required, and of the properties of which
the person using them was ignorant. A
person who so took a leap in the dark in
the administration of medicine was guilty
of gross negligence:' " Reg. v. Markuss,
4 Yost. & Fin. 356, 359. Mr. Bishop
then very characteristically and somewhat
dogmatically observes: "Now, in the
facts of human life, the less a man understands of anything occult, like the unseen
workings of medicine, the more confident he is that his knowledge of the
thing is perfect. Therefore, some of
our American courts have laid down the
doctrine, not altogether inharmoniously
with this utterapee of the learned English
judge, in substance, that, since it is lawful and commendable for one to cure
another, if he undertakes this office in
good faith, and adopts the treatment he
deems best, he is notliable to be adjudged
a felon, though the treatment should be
erroneous, and, in the eyes of those who
assume to know all about this subject,
which in truth is understood by no mortal, grossly wrong; and though he is a
person called by those who deem themselves wise, grossly ignorant of medicine
and surgery :" 2 Bish. Cr. Law, 664,
citing Commonwealth v. Thompson, 6
Mass. 134; and Rice v. State, 8 Mlo.
561.
We have quoted thus largely from Mr.
Bishop's excellent book, because we believe that in thus dogmatizing concerning
the lack of knowledge of their profession
by those following the sister profession of
medicine and surgery he has himself erred
through insufficient knowledge ofthat profession. "If a man knew that he was using
medicines beyond his knowledge, and was
meddling with tintgs above his reach,
that was [indeed] culpable rashness."
J.,

But it does not appear that Mr. Justice
WILLES, in the case from which the
above quotation was made, which was
from a charge to tfie jury at the Durham
Assizes, 1864, intended to say that this
was the only kind of culpable rashness.
It seems, on the other band, that this was
merely an illustration ; for he immediately adds : "Negligence might consist
in using medicines in the use of which
care was required," &c.
See supra.
That it was merely an illustration is
further apparent from the fact that immediately thereafter he adds another
illustration: " If a man were wounded,
and another applied to his wound sulphuric acid, or something which was of
a dangerous nature and ought not to be
applied and which led to fatal results,
then the person who applied this remedy
would be answerable, and not the person
who inflicted the wound, because a new
cause had intervened."
In the beginning of his charge the learned judge very
properly said : "Every
person who
dealt with the health of others dealt with
their lives, and every person who so dealt
was bound to use reasonable care and
not to be grossly negligent. * * * Another sort of gross negligence consisted
in rashness, where a person was not
sufficiently skilled in dealing with dan.gerons medicines which should be carefully used, of the properties of which he
.'was ignorant, or how to administer a
proper dose. A person who with ignorant rashness and without skill in his
profession, used such a dangerous medicine, acted with gross negligence." The
drug given in this case, and which
caused death, was a tablespoonful of a
tincture of colchicum seeds, containing
eighty grains of the seeds, eighteen
grains, as is said in the case, being a
fatal dose.
In Nanny Simpson's Case, I Lewin
172, 262, the prisoner was indicted for
manslaughter in having caused the death
of a man by administering white vitriol
as a medicine. BAiry, J. : "I am
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clear that if a person not having a medical education and in a place whcrc persons of a medical education might be
obtained takes on himself to administer
medicine which may have a dangerous

effect, and such medicine destroys the
life of the person to whom it is administered, it is manslaughter.
The party
may not mean to cause death; on the
contrary, he may mean to produce beneficial
effects ; but he has no right to hazard medicine of a dangerous tendency,
where medical assistance can be obtained.
If he does, he does it at his peril."
See
also Tassynmond's Case, 1 Lewin 169,
where the prisoner was convicted of
manslaughter in causing the death of an
infant by negligently selling laudanum
for paregoric.
It may be conceded that the cases of
Commnoawealth v. Thompson, 6 Mass.
134 (decided in 1809) ; and Rice v.
State, 8 Mo. 561 (decided in 1844), in
the former of which the law of the case
is contained in Chief Justice I'AasoNs's
charge to the jury that tried the prisoner,
and the latter of which is apparently decided mainly upon the authority of the
former, seem to lay down the rule that
in order to warrant a conviction for
murder or manslaughter, the defendant
must have some knowledge of the fatal
tendency of the prescription. An attentive perusal of these cases cannot fail, as
it seems to us, to convince the reader that
there was a palpable failure of justice in
both cases.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Thompson, the defendant gave to the patient
suffering with a cold, powdered lobelia,
and persisted in giving it to him for a

period of eight days till he was so com
pletely exhausted that no relief could be
alibrded, and he died of exhaution.
In Rice v. The State the defendant was
employed by the husband of a woman
near the end of tile eighth month of preg'
nancy, to cure her of 1 sciatica ;" and,
after having been informed of her condition and that other physicians had cautioned against the use of vapor baths and
emetics in her then condition, he commenced a course of treatment by steaming
and giving lobelia, and persisted in this
treatment till she had a premature delivery, a few days after which she died.
The evidence showed that she had been
married five years, and during that time
had had three children, always doing
well after a birth, and was in better
health when the defendant comnmemced
his practice on her than she had been for
many years.
It seems unnecessary to multiply cases
to show that the foregoing two cases are
erroneous.
The court in the principal
case has, we think, shown it conclusively; and the passages quoted at the
head of this note from Bishop and Archibald on Criminal Law, with the authorities there cited, lay down the rule that
ought to govern such eases. The court
in the principal case has carefully limited
the application of the rule there laid
down to cases where there was no sudden emergency and where no exceptional
circumstances were shown, and thus
limited, the rule of the case seems emi-

nently reasonable, and grounded on the
soundest views of public policy.
M. D. Ewzax.
Chicago.

LIENBACH v. TEMPLIN.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
LIENBACH v. TEMPLIN.
Goods purchased by a married woman on credit are not separate property; her
tredit is nothing in the eye of the law.
A married woman cannot acquire title to any property or business upon the credit
of its after-production.
Where a wife claims property as against her husband's creditors, she must show
affirmatively, by clear and full proof, that she paid for it with her own separate
funds.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County.
This was a feigned issue between an execution dreditor and the
wife of the execution debtor to determine the ownership of personal property levied upon. The facts were that in 1877 the
husband, Levi Templin, was indebted to Amos Rothermel and
others, and informed Rothermel that he could not meet his
notes. After some consultation Rothermel, on December 18th
1877, agreed to purchase certain property of Templin's, then in the
hands of- the sheriff for the amount of his claim. This he did, and
received a bill of sale. The following forenoon this property was
sold to the wife, Levina Templin, and she agreed to pay for it at the
rate of fifty dollars per month. She made the last payment February 14th 1879. After the bill of sale had been made Levi Templin
made an assignment of his real and personal property for the benefit
of creditors. He made claim for the benefit of the three hundred
dollars which the laws permit an insolvent debtor to make. The
household goods were appraised at about one hundred and eleven
dollars, and the balance to make up the three hundred dollars was
paid to him in money out of the sale of real estate. Levi Templin
as well as his wife, testified that this property and this money, after
he obtained possession of it, was by him given to his wife. On
August 10th 1880 Mrs. Templin applied for and was allowed the
benefit of the Act of April 3d 1872, securing to married women
On September 20th 1880 the present
their separate earnings.
execution was levied.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CLARK, J.-The act of 1848 provides in very clear terms that property of whatsoever kind or nature, which shall accrue to a married
woman during coverture, "shall be" owned and enjoyed by her as her
own separate property, "and shall not be subject to levy and execution for the debts and liabilities of her husband." It is her "pro-
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perty" only, however, that the legislature intended to protect; her
earnings, her efforts and her credit are her husband's, since the Act
of 1848, as before. What she may be said to acquire, as the result of
her skill and industry, on her merely personal credit, accrues to the
husband, and, as to the creditors, is to be taken as his: Raybold
v. Raybold, 8 1arfis 311 ; Bucher v. Ream, 18 P. F. Smith 420.
Goods purchased by a married woman on her own credit are
not her separate property: Robinson v. Wallace, 3 Wright 133. Her
,credit is nothing in the eyes of the law; when she does contract,
the law esteems her the agent of her husband: .lKeugh v. Jones,
8 Casey 432; Holland v. Horter, 11 Id. 375. A married woman
must have a separate estate to protect her purchase upon credit.
An estate available and proportionate to the credit it supports.
The purchase must in fact be made, not upon her credit, but upon
the credit of her separate estate; upon her, ability to pay out of
her own funds: Gault v. Sylis, 8 Wright 307.
The ownership of the corpus of an estate, real or personal, gives
title to its income and profits. The title to land gives title to its
products, no matter whose labor may have been expended in the production: Rush v. Vroight, 55 Penn. St.442; -)_1ussel v. Gardner,66
Id. 247. But a married woman cannot acquire title to land upon
the credit of its after-production, nor to any property or business
upon its prospective profits. The production and profits are, in
general, the result of the labor of the husband and wife, or their
children, and whilst creditors have no claim on the husband's labor
or that of his family, as such, yet, when that labor acquires title
to property, they may have a claim upon the property thus acquired.
When the estate is hers, the production is hers; the labor expended
in realizing income cannot affect the title to either.
It is admitted that Mrs. Templin had no separate estate; the
purchase of the property was made on her credit alone; the business was conducted with the property thus purchased, and the property was paid for out of the earnings of the business. We may
accept the verdict of the jury, under the charge of the court, as a
finding that the transaction was bonafide, and was not a device to
save it from Templin's creditors ; but, assuming this, the property
was not the property of Mrs. Templin ;.her credit, under the circumstances, was her husband's credit, and the earningg of the business was the husband's money; it follows, that the property
involved in the transaction of 18th of December, 1877, was as
respects his creditors, the husband's property.
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It was, of course, competent for Templin, so far as the transaction affected himself only, to place the title and ownership in his
wife, not only of that embraced in the agreement of 18th of December, 1878, but of that also which he had taken under the exemption law. A husband may freely bestow his goods upon his wife
or upon any other person, but he must be just to his creditors before
he can afford to be generous to his friends. The rights of creditors rise
superior to claims, which are founded on no valuable consideration..
Nor can we discover how the petition and decree of 10th of
August, 1880, which secured to Mrs. Templin the rights of a feme
sole trader, could, without more, have any effect upion the determination of this case. It is true that a portion of the property
embraced in the sheriff's levy was purchased after the date of this
decree; but with whose funds was the purchase made ? It has not
been shown that the purchase was made with the moneys of the
wife; where a wife claims property, as against her husband's creditors, she must show affirmatively, by clear and full proof, that she
paid for it with her own separate funds: -Keeney v. Good, 9 Harris
355; Camber v. Gamber, 6 Id. 366. She must make it clearly
appear that the means of acquisition were her own, independently
of her husband: Auble, Adm'r. v. Mason, 35 Penn. St. 262.
The fact that Mrs. Templin at the time of the purchase of the
cattle and hogs, possessed the privileges and exercised the rights
of afeme sole trader, does not dispense with the production of this
measure of proof. It was not the intention of the legislature to
dispense with the presumptions which ordinarily and of necessity
arise in favor of creditors in transactions between husband and wife,
affecting the ownership of property in the wife's name. The act
of 3d of April, 1872, P. L. 35, provides merely that the separate earnings of any married woman, however realized, shall accrue
to and inure to her separate benefit and use, and be under her
exclusive control, as if she werefeme sole, and not be liable to any
claim of the husband or his creditors. The act further provides:
"That in any suit at law, or in equity, in which the ownership of
such property shall be in dispute, the person claiming such property, under this act, shall be compelled, in the first instance, to
show title and ownership in the same."
In this case no such proof was made; the purchase-money was
supplied from the earnings of the business; but the business, as we
have already seen, belonged to the husband, and its earnings were his.
For the reasons stated, therefore, we are of opinion that the
VOL. XXXIII.-
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several assignments of error are sustained, and the judgment is
reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.
This case holds that a married woman
without a separate estate cannot purchase
on credit, because at common law her
credit is his credit, and the enabling statutes did not change the common law in
his respect.
This is a question of general interest
under the enabling statutes, and the
weight of authority is not in favor of
the Pennsylvania rule.
None of the state statutes, except one
or two, confer more power than the
Pennsylvania statute, which provides,
amongst other things, as to tie point involved, that all property coming to a
married woman during coverture by will,
descent, ded of conveyance or otherwise,
shall be her separate estate: Kelly on
Contracts of Married W"omen 289-544.
In all the states except Cailfornia,
Nevada and Louisiana, the common-law
and equity doctrines prevailed before the
enactment of the enabling statutes.
Under the common laws a married woman could not make a contract binding
on her person, but she could contract in
equity concerning her separate estate.
Hence the common-law and equity doctrines prevail, except in so far as abrogated by these enabling statutes.
There is no controversy in any of the
states upon the proposition that where a
married woman is possessed of a separate estate, she can contract in such a
way with respect to that estate as to
make that estate the debtor. But there
is considerable difference as to the details, and the application of this proposition, as well as in the application of
what is generally known as the American and English rules : Kelly Cont. M.
W., ch. 8.
The American rule is the converse of
the English rule. As to the point involved, the former holds that a married
woman can make no contract and has no
power but such as is granted by the

statute, or tile instrument creating the
separate estate, or necessarily implied
therefrom. The English rule holds that,
unless restrained by the instrument (statute), she is a feme sole with respect to
her separate estate and all her contracts,
respecting the same, including her bond,
bill, note, or other obligation, are binding on that estate: Kelly Cont. M. W.
251, et seq.

The states of Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Mississippi, Rhode
Island and North Carolina, follow the
American rule, whilst all the other states,
except those deriving their jurisprudence
from the civil law, adopt, in the main,
the English doctrine, with little or no
exception : Kelly Cont. Al. W., 259.
In Pennsylvania (following the American rule) if the wife is possessed of a
separate estate she can purchase on credit,
and the property so acquired will be her
separate estate and be protected from her
husband's creditors : Silveus v. Porter,
24 P. F. S. 448; Wieman v. Anderson,
6 Wr. 311 ; Kepler v. Davis, 30 P. F.
S. 153; Bucher v. Reama, 18 Id. 421 ;
Seeds v. lahler, 26 Id. 262; Rush v.
Vought, 5 Id. 437. Even if the property
so purchased be merchandise to be usen
in trade. Wieman v. Anderson, supra;
Welch v. Kline, 7 P. F. Smith 428 ; or
other property: Conrad v. Shome, 8 Wr.
193 ; and the products thereof, even if
acquired by the assistance of her husband: Musser v. Gardner, 16 P. F.
Smith 242. But as held in the principal
case, in accord with the former adjudications, if she has no separate estate she
cannot purchase on credit, for the reason
that if she, without having a separate
estate, purchase on credit, she must pay
for it (1) out of her earnings, (2) her
savings, or (3) out of the profits or products of the property purchased, which
in any case is the result of her labor or
the joint labor of her husband and her-
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self or family, and this, at common law,
belongs to the husband, and has not been
changed by tile statute : Robinson v.
Wallace, 3.Wr. 129 ; Bucher v. Ream,
18 P. F. Smith 421 ; Speak-man's Appeal,
21 Id. 25 ; Hallowellv. Horter, 11 Casey
375 ; Brown v. Pendleton, 10 P. F.
Smith 419. Yet the same court held
her purchase on credit good against the
husband and his heirs although not good
against his creditors: Goff v. Nuttall, 8
Wr. 78; Bawscr v. Bawser, I Norris
57; Patterson v. Robinson, I Casey 81.
And in the latter case her judgment for
the purchase-money was enforced against
the property purchased, although regarded invalid as a personal obligation:
Brunner'sAppeal, 11 Wr. 67 ; Tatterson
v. Robinso , I Casey 81 ; Ramborqer v.
Ingraham, 2 Wr. 146; Heacock v. Fly,
2 Harris 542; Conrad v. Shomo, 8 Wr.
193, and the reasoning in Manderbach
V. Mock, 5 Casey 43.
Inasmuch as the Pennsylvania statute
makes all property separate estate, which
the wife acquires by will, descent, deed,
or otherwise, her purchase on credit when
paid for by money acquired otherwise
than from her husband ought to be held
valid, because, as the law stood before
the enactment of the statute, she had,
with her husband's assent, capacity to
purchase on credit and to receive any
kind of property: Baxter v. Smith, 6
finn. 427; 1l'alker v. Coover, 15 P. F.
Smith 433; Cowton v. Wickersham, 4 Id.
302; Winch v. James, IS Id. 297;
Hileman v. Bouslaugh, 1 Harris 355;
Bortz v. Bortz, 12 Wr. 382; Vance v.
JVogle, 20 P. F. Smith 176; and so long
as the consideration does not come from
the individual acquisitions of the husband
his creditors have no right to complain.
The statute should be regarded as enabling and permit her acquisitions under
the words "or otherwise," whenever his
creditors will not be injured, and they
cannot be injured so long as his individual acquisitions are not withdrawn
from their benefit.

The New York statute does not conrain the words "or otherwise" contained
in the Pennsylvania statute, but limit
her acquisitions to " descent, devise, beThe courts have
quest, gift or grant."
held that a married woman without a
separate estate can purchase on credit,
and the property so purchased will be
her separate estate: Darby v. Callaghan,
16 N. Y. 21 ; Kt app v. Smith, 27 N. Y.
277. In the latter case the wife of an
insolvent purchased cattle on credit from
her husband's assignee and gave her
individual note for the whole purchasemoney.
She also purchased the farm
and implements, and gave her note and
mortgage for the whole consideration,
expecting in both cases to pay for the
real and personal property so purchased
from the profits of farming. Her husband was employed to manage the farm
In
and the other property purchased.
holding that the transaction was valid,
that it vested a separate estate in the
wife, and that the husband's creditors
could not touch the property so purchased
or the profits or increase thereof, even
though acquired by the husband's labor or
the joint labor of both, DExIo, C. J.,
said : "The object of the statute was to
divest the title of the husband jure mariti
during coverture and to enable the wife
to take the absolute title as if unmarried.
There is some difficulty in a married
woman purchasing property on credit,
arising out of the principle tlat she cannot make a contract for payment which
will be binding on her personally according to the general rules of law. But if
the vendor will run the risk of being able
to obtain payment of the consideration, the transfer will be valid, and no
estate will pass to the husband whether
the wife had antecedently any separate
estate or not."
This was previously held in Darby v.
Callagan, supra.
It might be urged in this case that in
view of the dictum (or statement) in
it the decision would be different if the
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husband had been in debt, and the earnings or profits from or by the property
purchased were necessary to satisfy his
creditors, in which case it would be
within the rule adopted in Pennsylvania ;
but the facts show that lhe was insolvent;
that there were creditors unsatisfied
and besides the opinion does not advance
this limitation.
This broad position was held in Abbey
v. Dego, 44 Barb. 379, where the court
stated that under the enabling statutes a
married woman without a separate estate,
can acquire title to personal property
(and a priori real property) by grant or
purchase, or in any mode known to the
law, or course of business, for cash or on
credit, if done honestly, and not as a
means to hide the husband's property
from his creditors.
The facts in Frecking v. Rolland, 53
N. Y. 423, were substantially the same
as in Ilallowell v. Horter, 11 Casey 375,
but the court unlike the Pennsylvania
court held that a married woman could
purchase on credit, no matter whether
she had or had not a separate estate. In
both cases the wife engaged in business
with borrowed money and purchased on
credit. In the former case the New York
court held her purchase valid, but in
the latter case the Pennsylvania court
held the purchase invalid; and in both
cases it was a contest with creditors.
Williamson v. Dodge, 5 Hun 497, was a
purchase on credit, but it was assumed in
the case that the wife had a separate
estate.
In Shields v. Keys, 24 Iowa 299, the
purchase on credit by a wife without a
separate estate, relying upon her son's
earnings to pay for, it was held valid,
for the reason, amongst others, said the
court, that in equity as well as under the
statute she has capacity to acquire and
hold property and the opposite partvcaunot take advantage of the fact of coverture. And in Mitchell v. Sawyer, 21 Iowa
582, the court held that she could borrow
money and purchase property therewith,

relying upon receiving money from her
father to repay the money borrowed.
And in Chamberlainv. Robertson, 31 Iowa
408, specific performance was decreed in
favor of a married woman where she
purchased on credit except as to the first
payment. In principle there seems to be
no difference between paying the purchase-money from the profits or production of the thing purchased, and paying
for it with borrowed money, subsequently
repaid from the same thing.
In Connecticut property purchased by
the wife with borrowed money was held
liable for the money borrowed: Donovan's Appeal, 41 Conn. 555, thereby
indirectly holding a purchase on credit
valid. See Langenbach v. Schell, 40
Conn. 224; Wells v. Tlwrmnan, 37 Conn.
318.
In Huyler's Ex.v. Atwood, 11 C. E.
Green 506, the wife purchased some land,
paid some cash, and for the balance of
the purchase-money assumed to liquidate
an existing mortgage on the land purcbased. The court said that the law, in
giving the wife power to acquire and
bold land, did not limit her capacity to
any certain mode of acquisition, but she
can secure the purchase-money by bond,
note, or assume the payment of a mortgage. "It is a contract they have capacity to make and it can be enforced."
In this state the statute provides that all
property which comes to a married
woman during coverture by purchase,
gift, grant, devise, descent, bequest, or
in any manner whatever, and also her
wages and earnings, shall be her sole
and separate property, free from the control and debts of her husband, in the
same manner and to the same extent as
if she were not married; which has been
construed to be for the protection of
the wife: prall v. Smith, 2 Vroom 244;
Porch*v. Fries, 3 C. ,E. Green 204;
Adams v. Ross, 1 Vroom 505 ; Vreeland
v. Vreeland, I C. E. Green 512; Outcalt v. Ludlow, 3 Vroom 239. And enables her to acquire a separate estate by
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any of the modes specified in the statute :
Covert v. Hulick, 4 Vroom 307 ; Homer
v. 11rebster, 4 Id. 387. But whilst she
can acquire a separate estate on credit,
such acquisition must not be used to
defraud innocent persons : Brown v.
Richards, 2 0. E. Green 32 ; Skillman
v. Skillman, 2 Beas. 403; Annin v.
Annin, 9 C. E. Green 184. And the
words "gift" and "grant" are not used
in the statute in a technical sense, but
are intended to embrace all modes of
acquisition : Huyler v. Atwood, 11 C. E.
Green 504.
In Missouri the exact point has not
been decided, but in Pemberton v. Johnson, 46 Mo. 342, the land purchased on
credit was subjected to the satisfaction
of the mortgage given for the purchasemoney; and in Fisk v. Wright, 47 Mo.
351, the wife's purchase partly on credit
and partly for cash was held liable for
the husband's debts. But see Johnson
v. Houston, 47 Mo. 231. In this state
the common-law disability prevails except in so far as removed by statute, and
she has no statutory power to contract,
unless it be to acquire personal estate, in
the statutory provision that all her personal property which comes to her by
descent, gift, grant, devise, or otherwise,
shall be her separate estate.
In Johnson and Wife v. Chissom, 14
Ind.415, and Haugh et al. v. Blythe Ex.,
20 Ind. 24, the court held that a maried women without a separate estate
cannot purchase on credit, and in Kyger
v. F. Hull Shirt Co., 34 Ind. 249,
the same court upheld such a purchase even against the husband's creditors. See Shaeffer v. Fithian, 17 Ind.
463. In this state the statutes have
been fragmentary, and the adjudications partook of the same character;
yet the result of the decisions appear
to show that the statute did not remove
the wife's common-law disabilities :
Kelly on Contracts of Married Women
373-376.
At the time the Massachusetts statute

limited the power of acquisition to descent, devise, or bequest or gift, and did
not confer the general power to contract,
the courts recognised and sustained the
wife's purchase on credit. In Spaulding
v. Day, 10 Allen 96, the wife borrowed
money with which to make the first payment and gave her note for the residue;
the court held the property purchased to
be separate estate, and free from her husband's debts, stating in the opinion that,
if the wife purchases property on her
own credit exclusively and takes the
conveyance to herself for her own use,
the property so purchased becomes her
separate estate. Her note given for
property purchased on credit was held
valid in Stewart v. Jenkins, 6 Allen 300,
and euforcable against such property and
she was held liable for her note given for
money borrowed to pay for land upon
which she carried on farming. Chapman
v. Foster, 6 Allen 136 ; Merrill v. Bullock, 105 Mass. 486. And this was the
general rule in this state: Allen v. $nller, 118 Mass. 402; Wilder v. Richie,
117 Id. 382 ; Ames v. Foster, 3 Allen
541 ; Faucett v. Currier, 109 Mass. 79.
But the statute in 1874 conferred on
married women the powers of afeme sole.
Before the enactment of 1874, which
conferred sul juris powers, the Illinois
court held that a married woman had no
power to purchase on credit: Carpenter
v. .Alitchell, 50 Ill. 470 ; and also that
she could purchase on credit, give her
promissory note for the purchase-money,
and the vendor could enforce payment
thereof out of the land so purchased :
Carpenter v. Mitchell, 54 Ill. 126. This
accords with Pemberton v. Johnson, 46
Mo. 342 ; Johnson v. Houston, 47 Id.
227; Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 279;
Goulding v. Davidson, 26 Id. 604;
Shields v. Keys, 24 Iowa 298. The
same result occurred in Mississippi,
where a credit purchase was sanctioned
in Ratlffe and Wfe v. Collins, 35 Miss.
580 ; Doyle v. Orr, 51 Id. 232, and rejected in Whitworth v. Carter, 43 Id.
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72, and Porterfield v. Butler, 47 Id.
165.
In New Hampshire a purchase on
credit was sustained in Coffin v. Morrill,
2 Fost. 352, and reje6tcd in Ames v.
Foster, 42 N. 11. 381, but on the ground
that the American doctrine, ts adopted
in this state in Albin v. Lord, 39 N. H.
202, repudiated such transactions.
In Buck v. Gilson et al., 37 Vt. 653,
the facts showed that the wife purchased
on credit for her own use and gave her
note and mortgage, which were also
signed by her husband, to secure the
purchase-money. The question involved
was .whether or not a person who levied
on this land under a judgment against the
husband could maintain ejectment, and
it was decided that it could not be done.
It has been held that a married woman
without a separate estate cannot purchase
on credit in North Carolina: Lanier v.
Ross, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 40 ; Atkinson
v. Richardson, 74 N. C. 458. Nor in
Maine: Dunning v. Pike, 46 Me. 461 ;
Newbegin v. Langley, 39 Id. 200.
Although .3errillv. Smith 37 Id. 394;
and Eldridqe v. PReble, 34 Id. 148,
seem to indicate that if the consideration
for the purchase does not come from her
husband, to the injury of his creditors,
the transaction would be valid whether
the wife had antecedently any separate
estate or not. Nor can she purchase on
credit in Alabama: Wilkinson v. Cheatham, 45 Ala. 339; Bibb v. Pope, 43
Id. 1.90 ; Marsh v. Mfarsh, 43 Id.
677 ; although it has been asserted that
she can purchase a separate estate and
secure the purchase-money by mortgage: Cowles v. Pollard, 51 Ala. 445;
.Pollardv. Cleaveland, 43 Id. 108; Scott
v. Griggs, 49 Id. 186. Nor in Kentucky: Robinspn v. Robinson, 11 Bush
174; Jarnan v. Wilkerson, 7 B. Mon.
293; Bell v. Terry, 13 Id. 384; Sweeney
v. Smith, 15 Id. 327.
In Arkansas a purchase on credit or
an executory contract is not valid : Stidham v. Matthews, 29 Ark. 650 ; Tubbs

v. Gatewood, 26 Id. 128 ; Elliott v.
Pearce, 20 Id. 508 ; Harrodv. lyers, 21
Id. 601 ; Wlrood v. Terry, 30 Id. 385.
Although the statute provides that a
separate estate can be acquired by gift,
grant, inheritance, devise, or otherwise,
the above ruling is grounded on the
American doctrine, as adopted in this
state, namely, that all her contracts must
relate to and be for the benefit of her
separate estate or for her own benefit,
which cannot be done without the possession of a separate estate in the first
place: Kelly, Contracts M. W. 319.
The Florida court did not decide the
question, although it was advanced in
Dollner, Potter4- Co. v. Snow, 16 Fla. 92.
In Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich.
447, the court sustained a cohtract for
the purchase of property on credit,
although it does not appear from the
case that it came within the terms of the
statute.
It is believed that this exhausts all
the decisions made upon this point, yet
considerable light can be obtained by
consulting the following decisions: Schofroth v. Ambs, 46 Mo. 114; Love v.
Watkins, 40 Cal. 547 ; Vance v. Nogle,
20 P. F. Smith 176 ; McAboy v. Johns,
20 Id. 9 ; Hamilton v. Taylor, 2 Cin.
402 ; Hlinckley v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 21 ;
Clayton v. Frazier,33 Texas 91 ; Kingsley v. Gilman, 15 Minn. 59 ; Batchelder
v. Sargent, 47 N. H. 262; O'Daily v.
.Mforris, 31 Ind. 111 ; Basford v. Pearson, 7 Allen 524; Gunter v. Williams,
40 Ala. 561 ; Richmond v. Tibbles, 26
Iowa 474; Woodward v. Seaver, 38 N.
H. 29; Baker v. Hathaway, 5 Allen
103; Rumfelt v. Clemens, 10 Wright
455 ; Stevens v. Parish, 29 Ind. 260;
Kolls v. De Leyer, 41 Barb. 208 ; Bruner v. Wheaton, 46 Mo. 363 ; Hunter
v. Duvall, 4 Bush 438.
The other rule advanced in the principal case that in Penpsylvania, in a
contest between a married woman and
the creditors of her husband, as to the
wife's ownership of the property in dis-
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pute, she must prove that she paid for it
with her own separate funds and not with
funds coming from her husband, for the
reason that, in the absence of this proof,
the presumption is that the means of
payment came from the husband, does
not accord with, and, in fact, is rejected
by the decisions in New Jersey, New
York, Mississippi and Alabama, on the
ground that possession by the wife, as in
the ease of possession by other persons,
is prima facie eviddnce of title, and must
stand until the creditors show that she
has no title ;, the onus probandi being on
the creditors: Stall v. Fulton, 1 Vroom
430; Kluender v. Lynch, 4 Keys 361 ;
Gage v. Dauchy, 34 N.Y. 203 ; Bodgett
v. Ebbing, 24 Miss. 245 ; Saunders v.
Garrett, 33 Ala. 454. And in Georgia,
1izTf v. Wright, 39 Ga. 41 ; and in
Wisconsin, Veymouth v. R. R., 17 Wis.
550; M5forrison v. Koch, 32 Id. 254;
and in Florida, Alston v. Rowles, 13
Fla. 117 ; and in Illinois, M3anny v.
.Rixford, 44 111. 129 ; Farrell v. Patterson, 43 Id. 52.
. Such a contract resolves itself into a
question of fraud, and in all such cases
the onus is on the party urging the fraud,

and as the law enables her to be the possessor of property, there seems to be no
reason why her possession is not prima
facie evidence of title, hence it appears
that on this point the Pennsylvania cases
do not accord with principle or the
weight of authority.
Notwithstanding this rule in Pennsylvania, that court has held that the wife
need not show her title so clear that no
doubt exists against it : Tripnerv. Abrahams, I I Wr. 220 ; 1lick v. Devries, 14
Id. 266 ; except, perhaps, where slic is
seeking a specific performance: Freeman
v. Stokes, 34 Leg. Int. 248. However,
in a contest between her husband's creditors and purchasers from her, or alienees
of such purchasers for a valuable consideration, the burden is on the creditors to
show knowledge or notice of the husband's ownership and creditors' claim on
the part of the purchasers, or circumstances which ought to have put such
purchasers on their inquiry : Keichline v.
Koichline, 4 P. F. S. 75 ; Keil v. Wolf,
7 Barr 424; Hoar v. Axe, 10 Harris
381.
JNo. F. KELLTr.
Bellaire, Ohio.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
NORRIS v. CORKILL.
Where by statute the common-law rule as to married women has been changed so
that she alone has the use and disposition of her earnings and property, her husband
is not responsible for her torts not committed in his presence or by his direction.

from Sedgwick County.
This was an action in the District Court of Sedgwick County
brought by Lavina Norris against Marsha Corkill and T. D.
Corkill, who are husband and wife, for damages for the speaking
of certain slanderous words by Marsha Corkill, -wife of T. D.
Corkill, of-the plaintiff, Lavina Norris. The defendant, T. D. Corkill, demurred to the petition as not stating facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against him. At the February Term
ERROR
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of court for 1884, the cause came on to be heard upon the demurrer
of T. D. Corkill to the petition. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case as to T. D. Corkill, to which ruling the
defendant excepted and appealed.
G. IV. C. Jones and 0 H. Bentley, for plaintiff in error.
Stanley ,&Wall, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HORTON, 0. J.-The question presented in this case is, whether

the husband is liable for the slanderous words spoken by his wife
when he is not present and in which he in no manner participates.
The rule of the common law makes the husband liable for the
torts of his wife committed during coverture. The reason assigned
for this liability is that the husband is entitled to the rents and
profits of the wife's real estate during coverture and the absolute
dominion over her personal property in possession. Another ground
of this liability at common law, sometimes given, is that the wife,by her marriage, is entirely deprived of the use and disposal of her
property, and can acquire none by her industry; that her person,
labor and earnings belong unqualifiedly to the husband: Reeves's
Domestic Relations, 3; Tyler on Infancy and Coverture, sec. 233.
Again, the husband also by common law might give the wife
moderate correction, for, as he was to answer for her misbehavior,
the law thought it reasonable to entrust him with this power of
restraining her by domestic chastisement in the same moderation
that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children; for
whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer:
I Blackstone's Coie. (Wendell's ed.) 444-445.
Under the provisions of our statute, the reasons assigned for the
liability of the husband for the torts of his wife no longer hold good,
and therefore, in our opinion, under the changes made by the
statute, the liability no longer exists. It is a part of the common
law that where the reason of the rule fails, the rule fails with it.
"At common law the husband had control almost absolute over
the person of the wife; he was entitled, as the result of their marriage, to her services, and consequently to her earnings; to her
goods and chattels; had the right to reduce her ehoses in action to
possession during her life; could collect and enjoy the rents and
profits of her real estate, and thus had dominion over her property
and became the arbiter of her future. She was in a condition of
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complete dependence; could not contract in her own name; was
bound to obey him, and her legal existence was merged in that of
her husband, so that they were termed and regarded as one person
in law:" Mfartin v. Bobson, 65 Ill. 129; Tyler on Infancy and Coverfure, ch. 19, sect. 216-283.
Under the statute, "The property, real and personal, which any
woman in this state may own at the time of her marriage, and the
rents, issues, profits or proceeds thereof, and any real, personal
or mixed property which shall come to her by descent, devise or
bequest, or the gift of any person, except her husband, shall remain
her sole and separate property notwithstanding her marriage and
not be subject to the disposal of her husband orliable for his debts."
Com. Laws of 1879, ch. 62, sect. 1.
Again, "A married woman, while the marriage relation subsists,
may bargain, sell and convey her real and personal property and
enter into any contract with reference to the same, in the same
manner, to the same extent, and with like effect as a married man
may in relation to his real and personal property." Sect. 2, said
chap. 62.
Further, "Any married woman may carry on any trade or business and perform any labor or services on her sole and separate
account, and the earnings of any married woman from her trade, business, labor or services shall be her sole and separate property and
may be used and invested by her in her own name." Sect. 4, said
chap. 62.
In addition, sect. 3 of said chapter provides that a woman
may, while married, sue and be sued in the same manner as if
she were unmarried. Therefore, it is not true, under the existing
statute, that the wife, by her marriage, is deprived of the use and
disposal of her property; nor is she prohibited from acquiring
property by her industry. It is not true, under the statute, that the
personal property of the wife passes to the husband; nor is he entitled to the rents and profits of her real estate during coverture ;
nor has he any dominion over her personal property, her labor or
her earnings. If she so desires, they are unaqualifiedly her own and
he cannot interfere with them.
Again, in this state, the common-law power of correction
of the wife by the husband is no longer tolerated.
Under the common law the married woman's legal existence was
almost entirely ignored. She was sunk into almost absolute nonVOL. XXX TII-18

